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11. Liberalism
11.1 Liberalism – Dogma, Ideology,
and Science
One
may discern scientific liberalism from demagogic or dogmatic liberalism. Liberalism
is an ideology that need not come in the form of demagogy. An ideology is a set
of ideas about how things are and ought to be. These ideas may be right or
wrong; however, if the adepts of an ideology treat it scientifically, i.e. as
conjectures open to criticism and possible refutation, these ideas do not
belong to the realm of demagogy.
If liberalism is to be a respectable scientific proposition, it must be exposed to the challenges of the practical world (of freedom). Liberalism should be a scientific process, open to revised insight.
Much of liberalism is couched on a very high level of abstraction. Statements that are valid on that level are nevertheless open to contestation on a lower level, the level of intermediary conditions.
Like other theories, liberal theories will often be incomplete, requiring corroboration in the face of intermediary conditions encountered in the practical world, which determine whether or not premises and expected outcomes actually match as initially presumed.
Liberalism is a set of hypotheses, some of which are being refuted by freedom.
Ultimately, liberalism ought to be a method rather than prescience of a societal end-state supposedly superior to alternative designs. It does not seem to be possible to measure freedom with the help of a utilitarian calculator. So all we can endeavour to do is make guesses and try to succeed in terms of persuasion by promoting certain types of rules, values, goals, prohibitions, and permits that promise to improve the common weal in the long run.
But the goal of freedom is a tendency broad enough to invite a vast plurality of differing views and policy proposals. We can neither prohibit the debate nor can we know beforehand which theories will turn out most robust, convincing and viable.
Differential replication of memes ensures that there cannot be a uniform notion and a complete practice of liberty, and that there must of necessity be a subset relationship between freedom and social reality.[1]
If liberalism is to be a respectable scientific proposition, it must be exposed to the challenges of the practical world (of freedom). Liberalism should be a scientific process, open to revised insight.
Much of liberalism is couched on a very high level of abstraction. Statements that are valid on that level are nevertheless open to contestation on a lower level, the level of intermediary conditions.
Like other theories, liberal theories will often be incomplete, requiring corroboration in the face of intermediary conditions encountered in the practical world, which determine whether or not premises and expected outcomes actually match as initially presumed.
Liberalism is a set of hypotheses, some of which are being refuted by freedom.
Ultimately, liberalism ought to be a method rather than prescience of a societal end-state supposedly superior to alternative designs. It does not seem to be possible to measure freedom with the help of a utilitarian calculator. So all we can endeavour to do is make guesses and try to succeed in terms of persuasion by promoting certain types of rules, values, goals, prohibitions, and permits that promise to improve the common weal in the long run.
But the goal of freedom is a tendency broad enough to invite a vast plurality of differing views and policy proposals. We can neither prohibit the debate nor can we know beforehand which theories will turn out most robust, convincing and viable.
Differential replication of memes ensures that there cannot be a uniform notion and a complete practice of liberty, and that there must of necessity be a subset relationship between freedom and social reality.[1]
11.2 Liberalism and Freedom Are Not
the Same
Liberalism
comprises a range of theories of freedom, but it must not be assumed to fully
capture empirical freedom, and there is a substantive difference between the
two.
Liberalism is a state in the ongoing development of (the science of) freedom – it is not a perfect theoretical mapping of freedom.
Evolutionary outcomes have no title to optimality; hazards may have “chosen” in their favour, while bypassing far better solutions. A mix of liberty and non-liberty may be an outcome-type representing a stable evolutionary pattern. Liberal purism in any of its forms is just too underspecified to allow for a world that fully covers liberal expectations.
Liberalism wants a liberal world, freedom wants a pluralistic world.
Freedom creates a corridor of diverging views, pluralism, and a dynamics of dissent. The evolution of dissent can not be stopped. Hence, there cannot be an authoritative and static concept of freedom. Therefore, policies intending to support freedom must be exposed to the open-ended process of political deliberation, opposition, scrutiny, cooperation, acceptance or rejection.
There is no royal road to truth.
Liberty is not a liberal enterprise alone. Liberty is not identical with liberalism.
Liberty is the result of many forces and liberty sets free forces that liberals may not regard as sufficiently conducive to freedom.
It is impossible to capture liberty by means of a complete set of rules – liberty is an open system with plenty of space for uncharted terrain.
Ultimately, liberty is a spontaneous order, if there is any. Evolutionary in nature, it may comprise and mix any type of elements with a large number of possible outcomes that do not necessarily have to be optimal, only sustainable.
Liberalism, not as science, but as an ideological doctrine and instrument of persuasion, may deliver accounts of freedom that deviate substantially from her as she appears in reality.
Liberal doctrine and commentary may well be tending toward corner solutions, shying away from complexity and situations of open-ended negotiability, avoiding the undecidable, and the loss of contour by concession and compromise, thus ultimately stylising a world never to be encountered outside the sphere of rhetorical evocation.
Substantial deviations from the ideal hallmarks of liberty may be a normal part of the spontaneous order of liberty.
Are there only unequivocally liberal policy solutions? Which is more ultimately liberal: the gold standard, currency competition, or rule-based central banking?
In reality, freedom is open-ended and the liberal can neither predict a perfect or optimal outcome, nor can he bring one about politically, even if he were resolved to attain such an end; instead at the point where liberty’s future is politically contingent, he might be well advised to relinquish freedom as projected outcome in favour of freedom as method.
Liberalism is a state in the ongoing development of (the science of) freedom – it is not a perfect theoretical mapping of freedom.
Evolutionary outcomes have no title to optimality; hazards may have “chosen” in their favour, while bypassing far better solutions. A mix of liberty and non-liberty may be an outcome-type representing a stable evolutionary pattern. Liberal purism in any of its forms is just too underspecified to allow for a world that fully covers liberal expectations.
Liberalism wants a liberal world, freedom wants a pluralistic world.
Freedom creates a corridor of diverging views, pluralism, and a dynamics of dissent. The evolution of dissent can not be stopped. Hence, there cannot be an authoritative and static concept of freedom. Therefore, policies intending to support freedom must be exposed to the open-ended process of political deliberation, opposition, scrutiny, cooperation, acceptance or rejection.
There is no royal road to truth.
Liberty is not a liberal enterprise alone. Liberty is not identical with liberalism.
Liberty is the result of many forces and liberty sets free forces that liberals may not regard as sufficiently conducive to freedom.
It is impossible to capture liberty by means of a complete set of rules – liberty is an open system with plenty of space for uncharted terrain.
Ultimately, liberty is a spontaneous order, if there is any. Evolutionary in nature, it may comprise and mix any type of elements with a large number of possible outcomes that do not necessarily have to be optimal, only sustainable.
Liberalism, not as science, but as an ideological doctrine and instrument of persuasion, may deliver accounts of freedom that deviate substantially from her as she appears in reality.
Liberal doctrine and commentary may well be tending toward corner solutions, shying away from complexity and situations of open-ended negotiability, avoiding the undecidable, and the loss of contour by concession and compromise, thus ultimately stylising a world never to be encountered outside the sphere of rhetorical evocation.
Substantial deviations from the ideal hallmarks of liberty may be a normal part of the spontaneous order of liberty.
Are there only unequivocally liberal policy solutions? Which is more ultimately liberal: the gold standard, currency competition, or rule-based central banking?
In reality, freedom is open-ended and the liberal can neither predict a perfect or optimal outcome, nor can he bring one about politically, even if he were resolved to attain such an end; instead at the point where liberty’s future is politically contingent, he might be well advised to relinquish freedom as projected outcome in favour of freedom as method.
12. Freedom as Method
(I)
The
arrangements of freedom can only be meant to serve as a discovery process in
search of the conditions under which human interaction, especially in very
large communities, is likely to unfold in reasonably peaceful manner, while
being conducive to growing and enduring prosperity.
Not only are there inevitably alternative and mutually exclusive conceptions of liberty; any set of liberal principles will be insufficiently rich in content to imply unique and complete solutions to all substantive political issues from abortion to zoning.
So, a complete world of liberty is not achievable, let alone by replacing politics with markets, or by tracing the implications of liberal principles as if by the thread of Ariadne. Contrary to such hopes, there are vast areas of the system of social order that require negotiation, compromises and power-broking among discordant parties.
The handling of political scarcity so as to defuse its inherent destructive potential remains the task of politics as distinct from bilateral trade. Inevitably, politics is incessantly productive of new permutations of the contingent and the indeterminate in freedom.
Not only are there inevitably alternative and mutually exclusive conceptions of liberty; any set of liberal principles will be insufficiently rich in content to imply unique and complete solutions to all substantive political issues from abortion to zoning.
So, a complete world of liberty is not achievable, let alone by replacing politics with markets, or by tracing the implications of liberal principles as if by the thread of Ariadne. Contrary to such hopes, there are vast areas of the system of social order that require negotiation, compromises and power-broking among discordant parties.
The handling of political scarcity so as to defuse its inherent destructive potential remains the task of politics as distinct from bilateral trade. Inevitably, politics is incessantly productive of new permutations of the contingent and the indeterminate in freedom.
The term freedom as method is meant to signify
the fact that those conscious of liberty must compete with many other
ideologies, and that to the extent that liberal pluralism admits of rival
political views and policies, and their (relative) dominance in government and
real life, liberty may yet have a decisive role to play as a method of
questioning and challenging these rival political beliefs, thus still assuming
a highly influential role in reality, while hardly being noted for her impact
in the eyes of the public.
The
classical liberal idea of law is a case in point: to the extent that the
liberal system of law is being honoured in everyday legal practice, liberty may
be rather strongly enmeshed in the goings-on of our society, even though
liberals may not figure prominently in the political arena ("the paradox
of freedom").
Liberty is present as method - and in this way she may be a very important corrective and guarantor of robust conditions of freedom - which do not bring about an ideal world but still one with substantial liberty in place.
Liberty is present as method - and in this way she may be a very important corrective and guarantor of robust conditions of freedom - which do not bring about an ideal world but still one with substantial liberty in place.
13. Robust Conditions of Freedom
Feasible
liberty depends rather on robust conditions than on a set of maximum demands; by
robust conditions we mean the characteristics of civil society – such as
freedom of speech and association, secure property rights, rule of law,
independence of the judiciary, etc - ensuring that individuals and their
organisations enjoy a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis other individuals,
organisations and government, effective political competition is possible, overwhelming
concentrations of power are prevented, and no social force becomes absolutely
preponderant in society.
As long as these robust conditions are operative, many different permutations of restrictions on personal freedom may be enforced without destroying or endangering a free society. Civil society is not jeopardised by a mandate requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets, notwithstanding the question of whether such a mandate is wise or the best solution to the problem at hand.
As long as these robust conditions are operative, many different permutations of restrictions on personal freedom may be enforced without destroying or endangering a free society. Civil society is not jeopardised by a mandate requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets, notwithstanding the question of whether such a mandate is wise or the best solution to the problem at hand.
14. Making Use of a Missed Chance -
The Spontaneous Order of Politics and the State (SO2)
Hayek cherry-picks evolution, cutting out
selectively some of the most intriguing among its indeterminate parts, and
thereby misses the chance to extend the paradigm of spontaneous order in the
social field to its full circumference. Instead he builds an illusory escape
from politics and the state into the
objective function of his model of a free society.
14.1 Liberty - A Politicised Stage in Human
Development
(1)
In this way, Hayek misunderstands a fundamental feature of freedom and
overlooks its weighty implications. For it is a grave error to assume that a
free society is an apolitical society. Liberty
affords all citizens, not just an elite, access to the political processes.
Being responsive to the high degree of natural inequality among
“in-divid-uals,” liberty is necessarily a highly politicised stage in human
development.
14.2 The Invisible Hand of Politics
and the State (I)
(2)
Owing to this “economistic” preconception, Hayek does not extend the analysis
of spontaneous order to politics and the state.
Hence, he fails to appreciate that there is knowledge embedded in the political order that no single individual can possess; knowledge which may still be generated, utilised and generally taken advantage of by virtue of certain forms of collective action, as analogous in some ways to the effect of simultaneous and interrelated collective action in markets.
Hayek ignores the entire dimension of constructive elements that are created in SO2 “by human action but not by human design” (Adam Fergusson) and, therefore, misses the rich vista of politics and the state as a discovery procedure.
We can only allude to the copious offering of insights waiting to be lifted by applying the intuitions so fruitfully exploited in Hayek’s work on SO1.
Think of the political order as a network of games and narratives, whose function is (a) trust-building among strangers, and (b) the reduction of hostile behaviour to levels that are compatible with peaceful coexistence and the attendant high levels of productivity.
People try out games and narratives whose success may not be tied to strict criteria of rationality and truthfulness; instead success may turn on the achievement of a stable non-violent equilibrium.
There is promising research to be directed toward the invisible hand in politics, that makes us understand “the sense in nonsense,” the symbolic function of politics, its institutions and practices as facilities providing orientation and stability in the face of wide-spread substantive ignorance as well as “merely” rational ignorance of the conditions of beneficial coexistence in modern mass societies.
Hayek’s correct epistemological argument in favour of personal freedom is in conflict with his desire to create social zones free of politics and state intervention.
Hence, he fails to appreciate that there is knowledge embedded in the political order that no single individual can possess; knowledge which may still be generated, utilised and generally taken advantage of by virtue of certain forms of collective action, as analogous in some ways to the effect of simultaneous and interrelated collective action in markets.
Hayek ignores the entire dimension of constructive elements that are created in SO2 “by human action but not by human design” (Adam Fergusson) and, therefore, misses the rich vista of politics and the state as a discovery procedure.
We can only allude to the copious offering of insights waiting to be lifted by applying the intuitions so fruitfully exploited in Hayek’s work on SO1.
Think of the political order as a network of games and narratives, whose function is (a) trust-building among strangers, and (b) the reduction of hostile behaviour to levels that are compatible with peaceful coexistence and the attendant high levels of productivity.
People try out games and narratives whose success may not be tied to strict criteria of rationality and truthfulness; instead success may turn on the achievement of a stable non-violent equilibrium.
There is promising research to be directed toward the invisible hand in politics, that makes us understand “the sense in nonsense,” the symbolic function of politics, its institutions and practices as facilities providing orientation and stability in the face of wide-spread substantive ignorance as well as “merely” rational ignorance of the conditions of beneficial coexistence in modern mass societies.
Hayek’s correct epistemological argument in favour of personal freedom is in conflict with his desire to create social zones free of politics and state intervention.
14.3 Biased Perception of Policy
(3)
Finally, Hayek sets himself up for misconceptions concerning real politics,
which mar all of his policy visions. Consider an example. In accordance with
principles and aims of (at least a certain variant of) liberalism, one might
favour a gold standard as a means to seal off the economic system against
politicisation and inappropriate government intervention. The expectation is that
by introducing the gold standard, politically induced economic crises will be
avoided. The place of inflation, malinvestments and boom-bust cycles will be
taken by a crisis-free, mildly deflationary economy, fully dedicated to stable
wealth enhancement. The liberal’s eye is fixed on a mechanism, the
self-equilibrating tendency of the gold standard, and its underlying
principles. The gold standard and its social consequences are neatly related to
one another, the latter being clearly derivable from the former.
However, what is missing is an appreciation of (a large and vitally important range of) intermediary conditions, in which the principles and their attendant mechanism are embedded, in a dependent position.
Why are they missing?
They are unaccounted for because they correspond to a type of spontaneous order that is not envisioned in the Hayekian paradigm.
No mechanism regulating the monetary system, including those, like the gold standard, that exhibit a strong self-organising character, can ever be insulated against political influence. Such mechanisms will not be implemented without political stewardship. They will not stay operative without political sponsors. They will not steer clear of countervailing initiatives and interventions without political forces to defend it. All of these requirements call for political management. Why?
A market mechanism cannot create its own preconditions. Politics must do this job - in fact, by the very definition of politics, which is the kind of human conduct dedicated to setting enforceable rules and rights in a society.
The more contested a mechanism like the gold standard, the greater the need for strong political resources to advocate and enforce its prerequisites. Innocent phrases like “unregulated private market” or “cessation of all government activity in the money industry” conjure up a world that cannot exist.
Politics, government and the state combine to form the tool by which people manage dissent and conflict–probably the biggest, certainly the most fundamental, attainment of the open society that humankind eventually arrived at.
However, what is missing is an appreciation of (a large and vitally important range of) intermediary conditions, in which the principles and their attendant mechanism are embedded, in a dependent position.
Why are they missing?
They are unaccounted for because they correspond to a type of spontaneous order that is not envisioned in the Hayekian paradigm.
No mechanism regulating the monetary system, including those, like the gold standard, that exhibit a strong self-organising character, can ever be insulated against political influence. Such mechanisms will not be implemented without political stewardship. They will not stay operative without political sponsors. They will not steer clear of countervailing initiatives and interventions without political forces to defend it. All of these requirements call for political management. Why?
A market mechanism cannot create its own preconditions. Politics must do this job - in fact, by the very definition of politics, which is the kind of human conduct dedicated to setting enforceable rules and rights in a society.
The more contested a mechanism like the gold standard, the greater the need for strong political resources to advocate and enforce its prerequisites. Innocent phrases like “unregulated private market” or “cessation of all government activity in the money industry” conjure up a world that cannot exist.
Politics, government and the state combine to form the tool by which people manage dissent and conflict–probably the biggest, certainly the most fundamental, attainment of the open society that humankind eventually arrived at.
[1] See Weizsäcker, C.C. von (2013), Freedom, Wealth and Adaptive Preferences, and other important
research results concerning the role of adaptive processes in free societies
here: http://www.coll.mpg.de/download/Weizsaecker/CCvW%20Freedom,%20Wealth%20and%20Adaptive%20Preferences.pdf
and http://www.coll.mpg.de/team/page/carl-christian_von-weizsaecker
Continued here.
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