Showing posts with label Classical Liberalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Classical Liberalism. Show all posts

Friday, 14 December 2018

Ancestral Sins — MMT, Economics, and A Little Break to Think

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I am grappling with these problems:

I would like to write an introduction to Modern Monetary Theory. The idea, however, is not to adulate a certain economic theory, but to encourage an approach to economic reasoning that is a form of critical thinking. never trust economics, no matter its form. MMT is a good opportunity to become aware of the problems of economics and the need to challenge it.

This is why, I consider it necessary to describe classical and neoclassical economics before going more deeply into MMT. The student should get to know the assumptions on which M(ainstream) E(conomics) — ME —  is based. This in itself should encourage her to take a highly critical attitude towards economics.

Now, where are my difficulties? Well, it is not that easy to concentrate the manifold contributions to ME into a representative presentation. Still more challenging: how to achieve a  very brief yet lucid and complete outline? I don't want the reader to get lost. So there needs to be a common thread that tickles and guides the curiosity of the reader.

What I want to show is this: you may give a verbal account of classical economics (CE) that sounds plausible. You may present CE as if its truthfulness was a matter of opinion, personal preference. There is  much scope to sell it as innocuous, inspiring, basically right, not a bad starting point etc — so long as you ignore the exact meaning of its underlying assumptions. Once you look into these, you quickly realise that you are dealing with entirely untenable propositions.

Basically, CE is an ideologically ossified rationalisation of a once progressive impulse — to free economic forces from unhelpfully restrictive political fetters. To get this message across a theory was developed that exaggerated the benignity and independence of spontaneous economic forces.

ME has never abandoned this bias.

Astoundingly, the development of ME has been a story of growing (partial) amnesia.  Assuming, mostly tacitly, that CE was correct, neoclassical models (NCE = neoclassical economics) are built on the basis of the precursor's false postulates and even more preposterous assumptions. Today, the mathematically most advanced models of the economy are jokes, they have nothing to do with reality, and only serve to heighten the autism of a economic theory that takes for granted the autopoiesis of a so-called free economy. "Applied" macroeconomics — with its models that guide practical policies — is based on these fantasies.

So, I need to find a way to present all this in a short, clear, and motivating synopsis which is to preface my treatment of MMT. 

Sunday, 4 November 2018

The Essence of Freedom

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In this post I revisit findings from my research into the phenomenon of freedom. I am preparing a post on the relationship between money and freedom and hope to find inspiration from my earlier historical and sociological investigations.

Having started from a partisan view of freedom, my research into the phenomenon has gradually steered me into a different position which I have summarised in a paper delivered at the University of Witten/Herdecke. Below find the paper's conclusion:


5.0 Conclusion

Discovery through political competition is not without risks, and it cannot guarantee the absence of severe error, but it is still the best way (1) to incorporate knowledge generated in civil society, (2) to keep politically dominant views exposed to ongoing corroboration and (3) to include the largest possible number of interest groups in the permanent sequel of repeated games that produce effective trust in society, thus bringing about the dynamic equilibrium of dissension and pacification which defines feasible freedom.

5.1 Lessons for Freedom

Classical liberalism tends to misunderstand or ignore the political logic of freedom, owing to a monadic conception of the rights underlying personal freedom. In theory, these rights are absolute, immutable, and monadic, i.e. attached to and owned by the individual in inalienable form. Under feasible freedom, however, people, in exercising their liberty, negotiate and renegotiate these rights, both in politics and in private transactions. Free citizens constantly renegotiate new permutations of feasible freedom, thereby constantly rewriting the social contract.

We detect an unexpected and rather incongruous similarity of deficiency in socialist ambitions for central planning and liberal calls for a depoliticised society. Both desiderata are based on incomprehension of a vital spontaneous order which concerns the economy in the case of socialism and politics and the state in the case of liberalism. Both political camps underrate or misconstrue the need and the logic of the indispensable discovery procedures required for strong economic performance and, respectively, the feasibility of civil society at large.

As there is no single person or group of persons capable of registering all inputs needed to calculate an efficient [allocation of resources], Hayek suggests inclusion of all citizens in a free economy to approximate far better the needed range and quality of information. Analogously, no single person or group of persons is capable of registering the inputs needed to take better political decisions than are available from a regime that guarantees the possibility for all citizens to make their contribution to political decision making. Incongruously, liberalisms akin to Hayek’s insinuate the equivalent of an impersonal central planer by suggesting that observance of certain rules activate automatisms in a free society, notably the market mechanism and the rule of law, that reduce the need of politics to such an extent as to portray freedom as a state of affairs distinguished by the absence of significant levels of politicisation - a visionary predilection that amounts to the disenfranchisement of the public. 
A free society, this is the claim of the present paper, is akin to a free economy, in so far as only the mobilisation of dispersed knowledge lodged in decentralised units (citizens and their organisations) can bring about a discovery process capable of sustaining human relations that make freedom feasible.

Liberalism cannot fulfil its role in a free society unless it acknowledges that its leadership in matters of constitutional integrity does not carry over into the area of legitimate political discretion. And liberalism must recognise that within the boundaries of constitutional integrity there is substantial leeway for political discretion by players of quite distinct emphases of vision. Freedom remains an open-ended project.

In order to establish her meaning and detailed shape, liberty depends on a political infrastructure that engages contestants in a competitive discovery process that is likely to result in eclectic policy outcomes deviating from puristic ideological positions. Adaptability is a survival requirement for any agent participating in the political discovery process. Puristic ideologies fail to stay in touch with the diversity of interests and views that push toward concrete policies. Feasible freedom may be conceived of as a dynamic equilibrium balancing dissension and peaceableness. Approximating the balance requires that the competing agents continuously search for new information about the prospects of their agendas, swiftly adjusting the latter to sustain support and the power to exercise influence. Precise and consistent accounts of freedom such as endeavoured by classical liberalism play an important role in clarifying the rules of the discovery game and the inalienable contours of freedom, but they are too abstract and too general to be able to prejudge the differing aims that people ought to be free to pursue within the competitive political framework of an open access society. Ideologies lend impetus to freedom’s sine qua non: discovery by political competition, but they do so fruitfully only when being capable of changing and renewing themselves in response to the findings elicited by the search.

The success of politics under feasible freedom is to be judged by the ability to balance dissension and peaceableness under the auxiliary conditions of high levels of personal autonomy, productivity, and wealth. We may register good performance and even progress along these lines in the very presence of states of affairs that appear insufferable from a classical liberal point of view. But it should not be forgotten that classical liberalism is just a set of hypotheses, some of which are rejected by freedom. Freedom is not identical with liberalism. Freedom is not identical with liberalism‘s account or expectations of her.
The source

Friday, 2 November 2018

The Wealth of Capitalism Is a Creation of Government

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In discussing the ideological reasons that compel mainstream economists to posit the neutrality of money, we have shown that the intervention in the economy by entities of collective action (the state, treasury, central bank) is indispensable for the modern Promethean economies that have provided mankind with continual per capital income growth. 

The modern economy is not a spontaneous product of unhampered markets and would collapse if we were to retract the institutional props on which the modern monetary order rests. Notably, it depends on money originated by a monopolistic and sovereign  issuer of the currency. In the absence of this arrangement, it would not be possible to sustain, let alone accelerate, the kind of ongoing economic growth experienced in the West during the past 250 years.

The meaning of progress turns out to consist in overcoming precisely the conditions that are supposed to be in harmony with free market precepts (Gold standard or the denationalisation of money), which are really efforts to repress that part of the growth of the money supply that is crucial for the Promethean upsurge.

Classically liberal proposals are effectively reactionary. Living up to them makes for stagnation or needlessly inhibited growth. 

Creation of money ex nihilo is the prerequisite for investing in perennially innovative, ever more productive solutions that increase the living standard on the basis of self-perpetuating economic growth. 

The vibrant markets of capitalism are a creation of government. They cannot survive without government managing the monetary system. 

No government, no fiat money.

No fiat money, no capitalist expansion.

No capitalist expansion, no modern levels of wealth.

Without a stable mechanism by which to expand the money supply to provide enough credit for investment in excess of savings, it would not be possible to attain the enormous growth rates that have been the hallmark of the capitalist age.

Investments that rely on the given money supply, especially on the given level of savings, lack the prospect of additional demand which is tied up in money lent out (savings) and cannot serve as effective demand for the products to be newly produced. To that purpose, new money, newly created money, fiat money, a viable fiat money system is needed.

Tuesday, 30 October 2018

(3) Neutrality of Money — The Barter Illusion of Economics

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I have found an interesting and very brief history of the concept of money neutrality in economic thinking. After a hard working day, I was too tired to read more than about half of the piece tonight. Here it is for future reference: The Barter Illusion in Classical and Neoclassical Economics by Dudley Dillard.

Continued here.

Wednesday, 22 August 2018

Neoliberalism — Believing To Believe in Something While Believing in Something Else

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Ironically, it is quite possible that a person dedicates her entire life to Catholicism yet never was a Catholic. A Catholic, say Susi, who is unaware of the full set of the central tenets of Catholic dogmatics only believes that she believes in Catholicism. By contrast, the expert of Catholic dogmatics knows that Susi does not believe in Catholicism, however strongly Susi feels that she does.

Likewise a neoliberal may consider himself a neoliberal, while he may not understand what neoliberal economics actually preaches. Hence, he too may only believe that he believes in neoliberalism. Those who take a closer look at the theory on which neoliberalism is based may discover either that the believer in neoliberalism, like Susi, (a) does not believe what she must be believing to be a neoliberal or (b) she genuinely believes in the right set of tenets, but then she is believing in something that is without consistent foundation and does not apply in any form to the world as it is. So again, she only believes to be believing in X when, in fact, she is believing in Y. She deems herself in the wrong world.

I think, (a) is pervasive, because few people who support free markets understand the elements that link up to a theory of a self-regulating economy. The way economics is taught does not encourage the student to demand a consistent presentation of the elements and links that are supposed to make for a coherent theory of a free market economy. They are distracted by the technicalities of fragments usually examined not in an order that would make it easier to corroborate whether matters coherently hang together and support compelling conclusions of the free market kind. They do not, and that is why they are not usually presented contiguously. 

Closer inspection pursued in an effort to restore the sequences of the argument reveals that the individual building blocks of the neoliberal conception of the economy are false no less than the theory that links up these elements. So, you may believe that you believe in free markets, but in fact you believe in something else — like a theory of labour markets that is not supported by the real world or a theory of how savings and investments lead to a equilibrium outcome which also is entirely contrary to what empirical evidence reveals of the economy as it actually operates.

In a subsequent post, conculding this series here, here, here, and here, I endeavour to sketch the building blocks of neoliberal economics, the way they are supposed to link up to bring about an overall equilibrium in the economy and the incoherence and untenability of both the building blocks themselves and their supposed equilibrating interaction.

Monday, 20 August 2018

The Left and the Right — Two Halfs of a Bad Circle


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A note jotted down in a tired state at the end of the day, on having read this post.

In order to act as economic agents, humans must enforce political decisions. Try to set up a farmer's market, you will quickly find that markets cannot exist without political action. And by politics I mean the attempts at and results of defining what is legal or socially accepted and enforceable in a community. Most economic activities and in particular the functioning of markets depend on people working out the political substratum in which economic activities are embedded. In that sense every economy is a mixed economy, if by "mix" we mean the simultaneous presence of strictly economic activity (such as trade) and politically determined constraints without which the former could not come about. 

In other words, the liberal ideal of market activities as providing an alternative to politics, a means of depoliticising society, is fundamentally ill-conceived. That is what the "right" must learn. 

The "left" should return to its roots which are closely intertwined with liberal themes — such as (a) to (d) see below — and rediscover that, in an inevitably political world, the quality of politics is significantly improved by 

  • (a) genuine pluralism, 
  • (b) democracy, 
  • (c) the rule of law and 
  • (d) constitutional provisions bolstering the former three factors.

The "right" are hypocritical in that

  • (a) by insisting on "market solutions" they pretend to be abstaining from political influence (when, in fact, they are not, because markets are political creatures and therefore political lobbyism is eagerly pursued by them) and 

  • (b), they gladly accept state intervention of any kind and scale when these intrusions serve their purposes.

The "left" are equally hypocritical in that they are willing to

  • ignore the broader concerns of a pluralistic democracy  — (a) to (d) — and

  • champion an authoritarian state as long as it enforces their agenda.

The "left" think politics is unproblematic, even ideal, when it becomes the tool of their desires.
In their rhetoric, the "right" pretend to believe that politics is naturally bad, deserving to be replaced by "the good market", failing to appreciate the good that can be done by politics. 

Enticed by the irresistible prospect of the government enforcing their goal, the "left" lose their critical distance visà-vis the state too easily.

Both deny a fundamental truth about the economy, namely its inevitably mixed nature as partly a political and partly an economic enterprise.

The "right" cannot be trusted to further and protect the state's capacity for serving socially desirable purposes. 

The "left" cannot be trusted to guard against the state's totalitarian potential. 

Desirable is a balance of the spontaneous developments and the purposeful inroads. Too much political forcing is no less detrimental than overreliance on spontaneous forces. Yet the dangers of imbalance will not be understood by those ignorant of the mixed nature of the economy. 

See also A Note on Socialism and the Mixed Economy.

Wednesday, 1 August 2018

Negative Liberty Requires Positive Liberty

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Having commented on a post relating to positive and negative freedom in Liberty Demands a Strong State - The Role of Capabilities, I re-post below a discussion of the subject that I have written more than three years ago in 2015:


It is an infelicitous move by liberals to place negative liberty at the front-line of their case for freedom.

Not all do - Kant and Mill did not - but many, including Hayek and most libertarians today do.

Its validity as a vital test criterion for policy implications notwithstanding, the perspective suggested by negative liberty throws into darkness swaths of issues that constitute the most urgent concerns of real human beings and their political representatives. It is a conceit to think that the logic of negative liberty suffices to define such a concept of "the good society" as is likely to be consistently pursued by real human beings.

Try to solve the immigration debate by applying the logic of negative liberty. Allow open immigration and there will be substantial discomfort somewhere in society, with its blow-back of political agitation, and social and economic upheaval, academic perplexity and hubris. Restrict immigration and the same effect will make itself felt in a different variant. Outside of the lecture theatre, we will be called upon to patch up the problems with a lot of action that belongs in the pigeon-hole of positive liberty.

The advocate of negative liberty places values in the weighing pan that embody wisdom we ignore at our peril; but there are other values to be accommodated as well.

The Precedence of Positive Liberty over Negative Liberty

Regardless of the libertarian preference for negative liberty, a society based on nothing but "do nots" is not possible.

While negative liberty may be highlighted as an important feature of freedom in the real world for purposes of conceptual analysis and political deliberation, from a different vantage point, we discover that workable prohibitions - the workhorse of negative liberty - require us to enlist all kinds of entitlements and empowerments that belong to the sphere of positive liberty.

Before rights can be defended, there must be procedures in place or - more broadly - acts performed that represent positive liberty and establish by fiat or single-handed deed the entitlements that constitute rights and the institutions of empowerment that ensure protection of the rights.

Liberty and Coercion

Identifying the demarcation line between negative and positive liberty is closely related to the question of legitimate coercion.

A regime of negative liberty is held by its proponents to be one of non-problematic coercion. But they are facing a nested set of difficulties.

The so-called principle of non-aggression postulates that coercion is legitimate only if exerted in reaction to the violation of the rights protected by negative liberty. This leaves unanswered a number of central questions.

Firstly, who is entitled to define the rights of negative liberty, and how are they to be practically arrived at?

Secondly, is it possible to arrive at these rights without coercion incompatible with negative liberty, or put differently: can we establish rights by "do nots" alone?

Could the differences between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists be resolved by acts entirely enclosed within the framework of "do nots"?

Thirdly, is it possible to define rights that do not entail an unequal distribution of (effective rights to or states of) coercion among the the law's subjects?

Red Cedars and Apple Trees

The negative liberty that protects my neighbour's apple trees and my red cedars from mutual encroachment may not rarely contain at least a latent distribution of unequal coercive power or a positive liberty that extends only to one of the two parties.

If my red cedars spread a tree disease to my neighbour's apple trees, it becomes clear that under continued non-intervention, I have a right to do something adequate for my purposes - to keep my trees intact while they destroy my neighbour's trees - while my neighbour does not have a right to do something adequate for his purposes - to destroy the disease's source, the assailant of his trees. I may attack his trees, but he is not entitled to attack my trees.

We have a situation of unilateral privilege of coercion - whether we do nothing to change the status quo, or weather we create a new option for protection on behalf of the damaged party, in particular, the right to cut my trees.

We see that from a situation of negative liberty there may arise a situation of positive liberty, which latter in a way has always been dormant within the structure of negative liberty to begin with.


Moral and Political Scarcity

Mankind lives in a world of moral and political scarcity - meaning: there are lots of issues on which people disagree absolutely. Freedom should neither be conceived of in ignorance of moral and political scarcity, nor should she be assumed to be able to do away with irreconcilable attitudes dividing men.

The Transrational Function of Freedom

The function of freedom is to take political scarcity from its highly explosive original level to another one of lower inflammability, where it is processed for reconciliation. This involves an entire culture and institutional network of compromise, give-and-take, and tiered layers of coercion - by which latter I mean, for instance, taking turns in being able to coerce the other party, as may unfold in elective cycles ("okay, you are coercing me this time, but next time, I will be in the driver's seat,") which may spawn games of relative considerateness, which in turn achieve the transformation of high-tension disagreements into habits of lower-tension coexistence. It substitutes insoluble absolute rational disagreement by a transrational experience of placidity in the presence of divergency. Incidentally, this is what I call the invisible hand of politics. Political participation (democracy) is indispensable for freedom, as it drives the culture of compromise, give-and-take, and tiered layers of coercion, mentioned above.

Relational Freedom: the Tug-of-War between Negative and Positive Freedom

It is impossible to pacify modern society under a regime of freedom without incorporating demands and initiatives of positive freedom into the framework of negative freedom. Both shape one another.
Positive liberty is the force that questions and tries to change the legal and political status quo, negative liberty resists and filters out the challenges that jeopardise robust conditions of freedom.

Zooming into full vision of society, we may state that the end product of freedom is the simultaneous presence of personal autonomy, peace and productivity - realised among hundred of millions of people related to one another in this way, without personal acquaintance. The marvel of a free society cannot be attained by insisting - to the exclusion of the other - either on negative liberty or on positive liberty.

Naturally, as the initiating force bent on transformation, even iconoclasm, positive liberty will always be a step ahead of negative liberty. However, as protector of the resourceful and inventing individual, negative freedom remains ultimately the mainspring of positive liberty and its demands for change in human society. And, of course, it should not be forgotten that within the confines of negative liberty plenty of change and advance is brought about.

Tuesday, 31 July 2018

Liberty Demands a Strong State - The Role of Capabilities

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A strong state is the prerequisite of liberty, and to become strong it is necessary for the state to bind itself to rules and institutions capable of controlling and constraining it. This theme, pioneered by the 16th century thinker Bodin, can be found throughout the history of liberty in modern times and at different stages in the development of living liberalism (Hobhouse, Dewey).

In my view, social democracy belongs in this tradition, being a liberalism updated to deliver capabilities that were unthinkable or hardly within reach when the modern state and liberalism were still in their infancy (though liberals were friends and supporters of the enlightened state from the outset).

A mature liberalism inevitably becomes a social democratic enterprise, a development that has taken place in the 19th and 20th century, and we are lucky to partake in it (though nowadays social democratic parties are hard at work destroying classic social democracy).

Indeed, it is the great irony of my research into freedom (initiated from a libertarian point of view) that it would ultimately convince me of the virtues of social democracy at a time when social democrats have given up their core convictions, having become hangers-on (like other traditional parties and the Catholic Church) of a new religion, the culturally dominant green mythology.

Anyone interested in the connection between the strong state and (getting the best from) liberty ought to read the absolutely magnificent book by Stephen Holmes: "Passions and Constraints. On the Theory of Liberal Democracy".

Saturday, 10 February 2018

The Bad Conscience of an Economist

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Short German summary at the bottom of the post (work in progress) / Kurze deutsche Zusammenfassung am Ende des Posts (noch in Arbeit)

I have started a series of posts entitled Neoliberal Economics and Its Rival, part 1, part 2 and part 3. The sequel is available only in German because it is based on a nine part series in English by Bill Mitchell. So my English readers are not left in the lurch. Also, I might rewrite the series to include  my own English summary.

The present post traces the intellectual journey that was to bring me to the point where I felt it is important to understand neoliberal economics and its Marxian and (Post-)Keynesian rivals better than I had before. 

In the title I refer to a singular rival, rather than rivals. This is because I feel that it is legitimate for my purposes to merge Marx's and Keynes's reasoning into one and the same argument against classical economics. For Marx was basically a Keynesian avant la lettre in
  • criticising Say's Law — the very base of classic economics on which neoliberal economics is squarely built — and
  • suggesting the new concept of effective demand to be the culprit responsible for involuntary employment, a phenomenon which the classics thought did not exist. 
While Marx had preempted Keynes' dismantlement of the classics very much in Keynesian terms — if not in Keynesian phraseology, let alone in the spirit of Keynes's accommodating attitude toward capitalism — the rest of Marxism can be safely ignored in this context.

For more see 


Turning to my main point, the economist with a bad conscience — well, that is I

I wasted my youth as a dogmatic leftist and became instantly a Wirtschaftsliberaler when forced to study neoliberal economics at university. While previously having censored my economic reading to avoid "bourgeois economics", I was fascinated by it once required to look at it closely. By Wirtschaftsliberaler I mean a person who may not be a liberal (in the European sense of the word) except for idealising capitalism and free markets.

Isn't it interesting that I did not care much for liberalism because I was a Wirtschaftsliberaler. That is to say: I thought that the capitalist economy was a social model that would take care of itself. So, if only we ensured we had free markets everything else would fall into places. This attitude would eventually spell the end of my (libertarian leaning) liberalism, towards which I had drawn nearer in the years between 2007 and 2012.  By that period, largely under the influence if Hayek, I had felt so taken by libertarian leaning liberalism that I began to study it very seriously, delving deeply into issues beyond economics such as history, law, anthropology. The upshot was that I discovered serious flaws in the liberal ideology. At some point, confronted with anarcho-capitalist radicals I found myself compelled to look for answers to the question why I was not an anarchist. Soon I realised that politics and the state actually played a pivotal, extensive, and indispensable role in making liberty feasible.

That was the time when I finally cracked my Hayekian dogmatism. For I began to understand that the spontaneous order of capitalism was embedded in another spontaneous order — that of the state and politics. The latter being just as much a discovery procedure as the former, only that politics and the state will always be the foundation of economic activity, even in a free society.

This insight does not make me an enemy of capitalism and free markets.

To the contrary, I feel I have become more realistic in my perceptions of them.

The point of becoming an implicit Keynesian was reached, when it occurred to me that to maximise the tremendous benefits of capitalism, we must take responsibility for it, guiding it around the pitfalls that it cannot evade of its own accord.

A free society is one in which everyone has the right to participate in the political processes. Hence it is a society with an exceptionally large potential for mass dissension, which includes both daily and more extraordinary episodes of economic activity. People have different interests and goals. They need to compromise and find solutions to balance their differences in reasonable ways. While capitalism with its free markets is a powerful and welcome helper of mankind, it is not a system capable of resolving the multifarious dissension that is natural to a genuinely free society. 

Capitalism can go wrong. And we need to compete politically for ways in which we may thwart or repair its dysfunction and derailment. This is true for the "small matters" of everyday economic life that abounds with issues demanding political resolution, such as organising a farmer's market in a village. 

And it is also true for large issues such as those relating to the balance or imbalance of the interests of capital and labour which capitalism endows with rival ambitions in certain important respects. But we can save our friend "capitalism" if we take political responsibility to target a reasonable reconciliation of interests.

For more see

The Economy and Its Markets Are Naturally Political 


One might say, it was as a political scientist that I got round to discard my former belief in capitalism as an ideal social order.

I had to overturn the Hayek inside me before I could appreciate that the economic system of capitalism was incapable of guaranteeing a desirable society.

To the extent that I had become a dogmatic libertarian leaning liberal, I was bewitched by Hayek's theory of spontaneous order. According to this idea, there are some rules out there. If we happen to chance on them and conform ourselves to them, we can otherwise act any which way we like and the result will be a spontaneous order that produces benign and optimal results, economically and socially.

Of course, Hayek has overlooked the essence of freedom. That people are free to seek out their own goals and solutions, creating thereby a spontaneous order of conflict and dissension. It is the challenge, burden and great prospect of liberty that people need to cope with and overcome the stress of rivalry that is natural to the system of freedom. For that purpose they cannot rely on a mechanism that kicks in automatically if only a number of rules are adhered to, producing ideal outcomes without fail. In order to get to a desirable society man must invest much discretion, run experiments that may fail, expose himself to trial and error, develop visions and carry them though amidst though competition from those striving for different aspirations.

Finally, I am coming to my main point. Why am I writing the series on (1) Neoliberal Economics and Its Rivals?

I want to understand what went wrong in my intellectual development.

I once told my History teacher that it was easy to write after the event about the terrible wrongs of the Third Reich and its Nazis. The real challenge, I insisted, was to write an essay in which you explained how you may have become a Nazi yourself in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. That would be an appropriately demanding way of learning from the past and building resistance from heartfelt inspection against similar dangers in our own time. 

I think the main fault in my thinking ensued from acceptance of the dogma that a free economy — the subject matter of economics — is a spontaneous order whose natural spin-off is a desirable social order.

What does this have to do with "Neoliberal Economics and its Rivals"?

Classic as well as neoliberal economics, which basically adopts the essence of classic economics, construe their view of the economy as a mechanism whose proper functioning produces both desirable economic as well as ideal social outcomes.

Central to this presumption is the
  • concept of equilibrium, and the further assumption that
  • economy and society are isomorphic, notably, that by letting the economy operate according to the rules that are appropriate to it, ipso facto a society of first best nature — of maximum wealth, peace, fairness, and freedom — is created.
These two aspects ensure that classical economics and neoliberal economics are indistinguishable.

The latter is chock-full of ad hoc excuses to rescue its basic economic philosophy from innumerable proves that it does not correspond with reality. Awkwardly, notwithstanding the absurdity of its defences, neoliberal economics succeeds in surviving and, in deed, dominating modern policies and the minds even of the broader population.

The reason why is related to my intellectual biography. No less than their precursor, modern variants of classical economics somehow manage to inculcate the notion into those millions of economics students graduating every year that an equilibrium economy (producing a corresponding society) is possible, good, and desirable, and that our efforts should be directed toward rescuing as much of this paragon as possible and always strive to come as close as possible to its complete implementation. Let me call this the fallacy of unwarranted promise (FUP).

While the classical economists believed they lived in the presence of such an ideal socio-economic reality, contemporary neoliberals find themselves frequently in a position to defend what they consider a feasible vision against sinful men who subvert the rules on which a free market economy depends for its smooth functioning. However, they succeed in asserting their view as the dominant paradigm.

There are two explicit expositions of the classical and the neoliberal conception of an economy.

The neoliberal model of an economy is spelled out in General Equilibrium Theory (Arrow-Debreu), a highly formalised mathematical theory.

As for my bad conscience, for a long time I used to say to myself that if only I had enough time to study the Arrow-Debreu model I would be able to prove the cogency of my believe in capitalism and free markets as an ideal arrangement.

Ironically, when I got round to looking at General Equilibrium Theory (GET) more closely, one thing stood out like sore thumb: if anything, the model establishes clearly that the real economy does not even remotely correspond to the equilibrium economy modelled in GET

To get to a complete, mathematically correct equilibrium outcome, Arrow-Debreu had to throw out just about every assumption that would create a link to the real economy, employing instead bizarre premises such as the absence of space, time, uncertainty and competitive processes.

Neoliberal economics has stuck to this pattern: realism be damned, main thing: the maths is right and looks impressive. Modern economics is very much a theological exercise in vanity by academics, whose results are eagerly recycled by demagogues and politicians to herd millions of people into the directions preferred by their most potent clients.

General Equilibrium Theory is immunised against rejection as a paradigm for policy by the fallacy of unwarranted promise (FUB), whose inculcation is the chief purpose of economics. And so it continues to dominate economic modelling today. Due to its highly technical nature, it is harder to demonstrate to the layman the irrelevance of GET for understanding, let alone governing, modern economies. So, it is not the ideal candidate for debunking the whole edifice of neoliberal economics.

But there is another reason why returning to classical economics is the best way to show that we are being misled and sent astray by modern neoliberal economics.

The fundamental notion of the economy inherent in both, the GET and less formal variants of neoliberal economics, is identical with the classical model. Only, the latter is less formalised, more accessible, and it is also being more straightforward, more confident in advertising its assumptions compared to the sophistry, ad hocery and waffle offered by modern mainstream economics.

GET and modern neoliberal economic thinking absorb the echo of the classics. GETers and modern neoliberals mean and believe the same things, when it comes to fundamental presumptions about how the economy works and why — in their form of conceptualisation — it deserves to be our ideal and guiding star.

Had I studied the Classics properly, early in my economic education, I might have discovered that their view of an economy is untenable, and that the Wirtschaftsliberalismus that I was going to internalise as my guide for the next 30 years was seriously flawed.

I had uncritically relied on authorities rather than using my own head and intellectual experience to vet the basics of economics, leaving me with a bad conscience that would make itself felt every once in a while.

Conclusion: Study the model that the classical economists had drawn up to comprehend the economy and you know what modern neoliberals really think about the economy, and what is doubtful about their point of view.


Deutsche Zusammenfassung:

Ich habe vor, demnächst eine Serie von Posts über das Urmodell des neoliberalen Wirtschaftsverständnisses zu vollenden. Drei Teile gibt es schon: hier, hier und hier. Dieses Urmodell ist nichts anderes als die Theorie der ökonomischen Klassik, die nach Adam Smith entsteht und sich von dessen politischer Ökonomie durch ein radikal mechanistisches Bild der Wirtschaft unterscheidet.

Es ist wichtig, sich mit der klassischen Theorie vertraut zu machen, weil sie über die Jahrhunderte hinweg das Grundgerüst des vorherrschenden ökonomischen Denkens im Westen geblieben ist.

Das moderne Wirtschaftsdenken ist klassisch, altmodisch und überholt

Spätere Varianten der klassischen Ökonomik leben bis in die heutige Zeit vom „Trugschluss des falschen Versprechens“ – ich nenne es oben im englischen Teil the fallacy of unwarranted promise (FUB). Das heißt, diese späteren Spielarten sind theoretisch durchaus nicht schlüssig, jedenfalls nicht in dem Sinne, dass die von ihnen vorgelegten Modelle die reale Wirtschaft in akzeptabler Weise abbilden. Der Realitätsverlust, den diese Modelle erleiden, bewegt sich nicht mehr im Bereich des Hinnehmbaren: in ihnen wird u. a. von Raum, Zeit, Unsicherheit, Unwissen und echten Wettbewerbsprozessen abgesehen. Infolgedessen halten sie empirischen Überprüfungen nicht stand. 

Es bleiben zwei Ausweichstrategien für den modernen Aufguss der klassischen Theorie: das ständige Verschieben der Torpfosten, also die Einführung immer neuer willkürlicher Zusatzannahmen (Schutzbehauptungen) im Bemühen, die Theorie einigermaßen stimmig erscheinen zu lassen. Doch selbst diese Vorgehensweise ist streng genommen unwirksam ohne die zweite Strategie. Diese besteht darin, Annahmen (größtenteils) stillschweigend zu übernehmen, die seit der ökonomischen Klassik dazu dienen, freie Märkte und den Kapitalismus zu idealisieren.

Hier kommt nun FUB voll zum Tragen: Jedes Jahr wird Millionen von Wirtschaftsstudenten eingetrichtert, dass eine Gleichgewichtswirtschaft  machbar, gutartig und wünschenswert sei. Außerdem bringe das wirtschaftliche Agieren in einer Gleichgewichtswirtschaft angeblich ipso facto eine ideale Gesellschaft hervor. Aus FUB folgt, dass  unsere Bemühungen darauf gerichtet sein sollten, dieses vorbildliche Wirtschaftsmodell so umfassend als möglich zu schützen und zu erhalten und uns so weit als möglich seiner vollständigen Umsetzung zu nähern.

Die Kunst der ökonomischen Rhetorik besteht darin, uns davon zu überzeugen, abstrakte Ideale, die in Wahrheit weder schlüssig noch realisierbar sind, als Leitbilder des wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Denkens sowie der Wirtschafts- und der Gesellschaftspolitik anzunehmen.

Schlechtes Gewissen

Den Ökonomen in mir hat immer wieder mal ein schlechtes Gewissen geplagt. Er spürte, dass er jemandem auf den Leim gegangen sein mochte, sich vielleicht selbst betrügt. Aber er ging dem Verdacht nicht konsequent nach. Heute weiß ich, dass ich mich von FUB habe täuschen lassen und, dass ich mich als Wirtschaftsliberaler im Grunde nur einem Glauben angeschlossen habe, statt mich auf dem Boden einer soliden Wissenschaft zu bewegen, wie es mir trügerischerweise schien.

Ursprung und Kern eines Glaubens: die ökonomische Klassik

Die klassischen Ökonomen waren fest davon überzeugt, dass ihr Denken die Wirtschaft, die sie umgab, wahrhaftig abbildete. Anders als die heutigen Ökonomen, die sich mit theoretisch-formalem Pomp und sophistischem Lavieren ständig drohender Entlarvung zu entwinden suchen, besaßen die Klassiker noch das Selbstbewusstsein und den Mut, die tiefer innerer Überzeugung entspringen. Sie sprachen ihre Annahmen klar aus und gaben ihnen eine leicht nachvollziehbare Form. 

Wie vor Jahr und Tag verdankt auch heute noch das große Ganze dessen, was man als freie Wirtschaft bezeichnet, seinen logischen Zusammenhalt dem klassischen Glaubensbekenntnis. 

Allein, dass heutige Wirtschaftswissenschaftler diesen Glaubenskanon häufig nur noch andeuten, gewissermaßen wie eine Stimmgabel anschlagen und für sich klingen lassen. Denn sie kennen den Ursprung dieser Doktrin nicht und sind nicht imstande, das in ihr entworfene Gesamtbild in lückenloser Authentizität – mit all seinen Brüchen und Unstimmigkeiten – aufzuspannen. Oder sie schweigen davon, weil sie ein schlechtes Gewissen plagt, das sie daran erinnert, wie wenig stichhaltig die Theorie der freien Wirtschaft in Wirklichkeit ist. Wohlgemerkt muss das nicht heißen, dass die besten Annäherungen an eine Nicht-Planwirtschaft schon deshalb als verwerflich abzulehnen sind, weil ihre theoretischen Rechtfertigungen in die Irre gehen. 

Wir müssen uns aber darüber im Klaren sein, dass das, was die Idealisierungen der freien Wirtschaft salonfähig macht, nicht ein schlagender wissenschaftlicher Beweis ist, sondern eine verführerische Atmosphäre, ein uns auf Zuspruch einstimmendes Hintergrundrauschen, in dem die Stimmen der Klassiker zusammenklingen, um uns dem Bild einer Wirtschaft gewogen zu machen, die real und ideal zugleich sein soll. 

Ohne Einsicht in die Schwächen der freien Wirtschaft – keine solide Theorie des Kapitalismus

Bevor Keynes in den 1930er Jahren mit seiner antiklassischen Wirtschaftslehre in Erscheinung getreten ist, fehlte eine konsequente Theorie der gemischten (nicht idealisierten) Wirtschaftsformen, zu welchen jede freie Wirtschaft zählt. Die Idealisierung der freien Wirtschaft – weiterhin das Grundmodell der Ökonomie und der Wirtschaftspolitik – hat nur eine zusammenhängende Rechtfertigung: das Wirtschaftsbild der klassischen Ökonomen.

Schlussfolgerung: Wer das Wirtschaftsmodell der Klassiker versteht, gewinnt damit automatisch Einsicht darüber, wie Neoliberale heutzutage tatsächlich über die Wirtschaft denken – was ihnen oft selbst nur unvollkommen bewusst ist, weil sie sich der irrigen Annahmen und Fehlschlüsse der von ihnen unterstützten Lehre nicht bewusst sind. Nur wenn wir zurückkehren zu der originären Theorie der klassischen Ökonomen sind wir imstande zu würdigen, was wertvoll und was fragwürdig an deren Weltbild ist und welche Erbschaft es uns in den Schriften der zeitgenössischen Wirtschaftslehre und in den Sachzügen der modernen Wirtschaftspolitik hinterlässt.

Wednesday, 10 January 2018

What Is Wrong with Macroeconomics?


Image credit


See German version below / Siehe deutsche Version unten.
 
... there is no simple relation between individual and aggregate behavior, and to assume that behavior at one level can be assimilated to that at the other is simply erroneous ...

That's the answer — to the question “What Is Wrong with Macroeconomics” — in a nutshell, taken from a useful synoptic article that traces the origins of modern mainstream economics back to an interpretation of Adam Smith, according to which 

  • a free economy is one where all markets clear (global equilibrium), thereby creating optimal conditions for economic production and distribution as well as first best social outcomes. 

All hinges on global equilibrium. 

But global equilibrium can be modelled — i.e. made to work theoretically — only under highly unrealistic assumptions. The model cannot claim to be even remotely capable of reflecting the true working of an economy. It replaces the real agents of economic life with so called “representative agents” whose overriding purpose is to make the model produce equilibrium outcomes.

Again, a case of a model modelling itself.  

See here for a more detailed discussion of the abject failure of the DSGE-(global equilibrium)-model, which is used in mainstream macroeconomics to 

  • teach (i.e. indoctrinate) students, 

  • research (i.e. embroil the macroeconomics in egregious contradictions and thus further the subjects regress) and 

  • advise governments (i.e. mislead them and encourage false and dangerous policies).


***

... es gibt keinen einfachen Zusammenhang zwischen dem Verhalten des Individuums und dem Verhalten von Bestimmungsgrößen, die sich aus dem Zusammenwirken von Individuen ergeben. Anzunehmen, dass das Verhalten auf der einen Ebene ohne weiteres auf die andere übertragen werden kann, ist einfach falsch ...

Das ist in aller Kürze die Antwort auf die Frage Was stimmt nicht mit der Makroökonomie? Sie stammt aus einem lesenswerten Überblickartikel, in dem der Ursprung der modernen Makroökonomie zurückgeführt wird auf eine Lesart des Werks von Adam Smith, wonach

  • eine freie Wirtschaft dadurch gekennzeichnet ist, dass in ihr alle Märkte Angebot und Nachfrage in Einklang bringen (globales, markträumendes Gleichgewicht) und im Zuge dessen optimale Bedingungen für Produktion und Verteilung der Wirtschaftsgüter sowie bestmögliche gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse hervorbringen.

Alles hängt davon ab, dass ein globales Gleichgewicht erzielt wird.

Doch ein globales Gleichgewicht lässt sich nur mit Modellen darstellen, die auf äußerst unrealistischen Annahmen beruhen. Diese Modelle sind weit davon entfernt, die wahre Funktionsweise einer Wirtschaft abzubilden. Sie ersetzen die realen Akteure des Wirtschaftslebens mit sogenannten „repräsentativen Agenten“, deren vornehmlicher Zweck darin besteht, es zu ermöglichen, mit dem Modell Gleichgewichtsergebnisse zu simulieren.

Wieder ein Fall von „Modell modelliert sich selbst“.

Dieser (englische) Blog-Beitrag enthält eine ausführlichere Erörterung der Ursachen für das Versagen des DSGE Modells, das von den Vertretern der vorherrschenden Makroökonomie verwendet wird in 

  • Lehre (zwecks Indoktrinierung der Studenten), 

  • Forschung (um die himmelschreienden Widersprüche des Modells und damit den Rückschritt der Makroökonomie zu verfestigen) und 

  • Politikberatung (wo es dazu dient, Entscheidungsträger in die Irre zu führen und falsche und gefährliche wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen zu begünstigen).

Tuesday, 12 December 2017

Hayek's Fatal Conceit

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I have written extensively on Hayek, see here and here. As they seem to corroberate my findings, I found the below excerpts and the article, from which they were taken, very interesting.
As an evolutionist critiquing the field of economics, I felt like a disciplinary outsider until I encountered the work of Friedrich Hayek. The Austrian economist was himself critical of Walrasian general equilibrium theory and proposed a radical alternative: Economic systems are a form of distributed intelligence that evolved by cultural group selection. They work without having been designed by anyone.

That was my area of expertise. I had to admire Hayek as a pioneer, especially since group selection was a heresy and the study of human cultural evolution was in its infancy when he wrote. Nevertheless, both topics have advanced by leaps and bounds since then and do not support his view that economic systems work best in the absence of regulations. Instead, cultural group selection theory points to a middle road between laissez faire and centralized planning that is rich with possibilities.
Some neat insights from this article:

Hayek's ignorance of the mixed nature of the economy in a free society
Hayek advocated the market not on grounds of optimality, but by default. The alternative, central planning, could not work, and moreover any substantial degree of government intervention in the economy, he feared, was bound to be a threat to liberal values. Remember, when he wrote Road to Serfdom, he was not thinking about Nordic social democracy, he was writing under the shadow of Hitler and Stalin.
[...]
Hayek fails to see: spontaneous order is not confined to the economy, but shapes political outcomes and is affected by politics
What distinguished Hayek was his claim that evolutionary reasoning demonstrated the superiority of substantially unregulated markets.
But this exercise in social Darwinism at the system level need not run along the lines that Hayek chose. Another great conservative thinker, Talcott Parsons, in 1964, had advanced the idea that among ways of organizing society there are “evolutionary universals,” that is, systems that emerge frequently in a variety of environments and persist over long periods once “hit upon” by a population. These are societal analogues to complex biological characteristics such as vision, which are such good ideas that they evolve independently in many species, and are [...] seldom abandoned as a result of evolutionary processes.

Parson’s list of the ‘evolutionary universals’ includes markets and money but it also includes “authority of office…backed by coercive force” as “the most effective large scale administrative organization that man has invented, and there is no direct substitute for it.” For Parsons, states as well as markets, pass the test of evolutionary success.
[...]

Hayek does not appreciate that economic activity is political by nature, and hence markets do not offer an alternative to politics
... Hayek stressed: information is scarce, and what one person knows another does not. A result of this situation – called ‘asymmetric information’ – is that it is impossible to write an enforceable contract to cover all of the aspects of the exchange that matter to someone affected. Perhaps surprisingly, what seems a detail – the contract is incomplete – turns the standard economic model on its head.