Institutionalised Corruption in "Science" (1)

 

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Richard Lindzen reminds us that the now dominant climate models failing to take into account a host of phenomena vitaly affecting climate are therefore simply not justified in making predictions of global temperatures with the cocksure assertiveness expressed in hysterical alarmism.

Having exposed the feeble grounding of prevalent climate science, Lindzen poses this question:

How did we get to this point where the science ceased to be interested in the fascinating question of accounting for the remarkable history of the earth's climate, for an understanding of how climate actually works, and instead devoted itself to a component of political correctness.

Lindzen points to the fact that the number of staff and students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (where he taught) has not changed much since the 1960s, but the number of administrative positions has seen a tenfold expansion. The latter are intimately tied to politics and political interest groups, some of which have been able to impose their agendas on the scientific process.

Continued here.

EF (10) — Freedom and Misconceptions of Money — Quotes and Links on Say's Law and Money Neutrality

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Being rather more like a personal note for future reference, this post is not really a statement addressed to my readership; however, I am happy to share my groping efforts with anyone who may take an interest in my attempts at writing the third part - the one concerned with economics - of my book (i.e. long series of posts) on liberty.

In the prior two parts on The State and Politics I have shown that modern societies with a high degree of liberty depend — no less than earlier and more rudimentary societies with considerably lesser room for freedom — on organised enforcing capabilities, that is: controlled violence, power, and dominance, whose evolutionary terminal is the state, the most effective structure of maximal power in an enduringly viable community. Intertwined with The State is Politics, another anthropologically ubiquituous means to organise society through (inevitable but also often dispensable) repression and command. 

In a free society, Politics — like The State — serves to refine the means and quality of enforced confinement to which all members of society are subjected. Thus, non-violent games (of political competiton like electoral processes) may take the place of lethal battles, and losing parties may be accorded a status of respect and comfort, and be granted an irrevocable right to challenge the victorious order in future rounds of contestation. 

Politics and the State need to be comprehended in these capacities — and in their indispensability in a regime of liberty — if one wishes to get a grasp of the role of The Economy in a free society. 

The Economy is based on governmental actions and determinations and the political processes that drive the former. The Economy is neither an entity distinct from Politics and the State nor an alternative to a world where economic life is permeated by Politics and the State.

From my conception of liberty it follows therefore that theories of the economy that ignore, deny or trivialise the political and state-dependent nature of economic activity misrepresent the conditions of freedom.

I find MMT to offer a theory of The Economy that is congenial to my view of liberty according to which The Economy is a highly and inescapably political arena.

In tune with this post where I highlight the insight that

... the root problem of economics is the total confusion of anyone and everyone on what money is ...

I hope to show — as a preludium to my presentation of MMT — that in classical and neoclassical economics the desire to represent the overall economy as a system of benign equilibrium has led their adepts to leave out important aspects of The Economy (of a free society), in particular money, and that this omission has corrupted the subject matter both in terms of scientific integrity and in terms of its suitability for political advice.

The below quotes and links add to a growing bibliography from which I hope to draw a consistent account of how preconceptions in favour of a naturally equilibrating economy have prevented economics to adequately incorporate money into its reasoning and thereby committed itself to erroneous and irresponsible narratives of The Economy.

Ironically, the initial impulse to advertise the power of (relatively) free markets has enticed its advocats to ignore fundamental preconditions and implications of an economy operating under a regime of unprecedented liberty.

Free markets, in order to be as free as they possibly can and ought to be, require considerable and constant governmental and political intervention. Hence, the question is not whether markets must be free of governmental/political intervention or not—much rather, the pertinent issue relates to the kind and quality of such interventions.   

— — —

Mitchell in There is no unemployment in a non-monetary economy on Ricardo's Corn Model (Februrary 21, 2012):

This model was used to show how the rate of profit was determined by production (not exchange) and also was used to deny the possibility of generalised over-production.

This follows from the following logic. Total output (in units of corn) can be consumed (C) or saved (S). Any corn saved is automatically re-planted (which is considered to be investment (I)) so by definition C + I = C + S and so S = I. What is not consumed each year automatically becomes investment and the only question of interest is the composition between C and I. This was a simplistic version of Say’s Law.

Also contains interesting quotes from Paul Davidson and an explanation of how State Money is the prerequisite for unemployment.

Mitchell in The natural rate of interest is zero on Say's and Walras' Law (August 30, 2009):

Accordingly, you have to consider markets equilibrate through price adjustments and the economy tends to full employment (meaning there cannot be a deficiency of aggregate demand). So if consumption falls (because saving rises), the interest rate (in the loanable funds market) falls (excess supply of loans) and investment rises to fill the gap left by the fall in consumption. This is Say’s Law which is restated as Walras’ Law when multiple markets are introduced.

So the interest rate adjusts to the natural interest rate where the full-employment level of savings equals investment and all is well. There is never a shortage of investment projects but their introduction is impacted upon by the cost of funds. There is never unemployment!

(1) Economics and Freedom — The Money Economy Is a State-Based Enterprise

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Under the title "Economics and Freedom", I am starting a novel suite of posts, which might become the core of the third and last part of a book on "Freedom", the first part of which dealing with "The State", the second part discussing "Politics".

With hindsight, I find it remarkable that — according to my unprejudiced research — the state and politics turn out to be fundamental to the project of freedom. They are pivotal and determine the shape and possibilities of freedom, including the conditions of economic action in a free society. 

The quality of the relationship between the state, politics, and economics is not so much a question of which part has precedence over the other than one of the effects of the simultaneous presence and mututal penetration of these three spheres.

This implies an unexpected convergence of my findings concerning freedom with the ideas of chartalism and Modern Money Theory (MMT), theories that emphasise the foundational role of the state in defining the nature and scope of money, and hence the way in which an economy works that is predicated on money. 

A money economy is a state-based enterprise. The effects of the state on the economy are pervasive and (in a number of important respects) non-optional; the performance of the economy and its impact on human life is intimately tied to the state and the politics that determines state action. 

The economy is no alternative to politics and the state. The latter are part of its fabric. In this sense, do not expect free markets to replace or diminish the role of politics and the state.

There are economic policies and ways of dealing with the economy that are wiser than others, but no degree of wisdom in these matters will suspend the fundamental fact that the economy is a sphere affected permanently and on all levels by politics and the state. 

Individualism and individual freedom are important parts of this connex. Representing crucial ingredients to the way economic activity is conducted in a free society, by no means do they open up an alternative path to a supposedly depoliticised economy.

[Ich versuche mich an einer neuen Reihe — Economics and Freedom — die vielleicht dazu dienen wird, den dritten Teil eines Buchs zum Thema "Freiheit" zu bilden. Die ersten Teile befassen sich mit dem "Staat" und der "Politik". Es ist bemerkenswert, dass mich meine Forschung auf dem Gebiet der Freiheit, ganz entgegen meinen Erwartungen, zu der Erkenntnis geleitet hat, wonach der Staat und das politische Verhalten der Menschen überhaupt erst die Grundlage der Freiheit schaffen. Das heißt die Freiheit ist ein kollektives Projekt. Freiräume für Individuum, Individualismus und persönliche Freiheit sind Derivate der sozialen Natur der Freiheit. Ebenso gilt, dass die Wirtschaftssphäre keine Alternative  zum staatsvermittelten und grundlegend politischen Charakter der Freiheit bietet.  Es kann klügere und weniger klügere Arten des Umgang mit der Wirtschaft geben, aber es ist unmöglich die Wirtschaft aus ihrer Verankerung im Staat und im politischen Wettbewerb der Menschen herauszulösen.

Interessanter Weise konvergieren diese Erkenntnisse meiner Freiheits-Forschung mit denen des Chartalismus und der Modernen Geldtheorie (MGT, oder auch: Modern Monetary Theory - MMT), die zeigen, dass das Geld ein Produkt des Staats ist und somit eine moderne, auf Geld beruhende Wirtschaft aufs Engste verwobenen ist mit staatlichen Funktionen.]

Liberals and the Left

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Geoffrey Hodgson argues:

... the very vitality and survival of the Labour Party has been largely due to Liberals and liberalism. Strange but true.

[... Lebenskraft und Überleben der Labour Party verdanken sich in großem Maße Liberalen und dem Liberalismus. Sonderbar, aber wahr. IGTU.]

Make sure to read this post, in which he explains that success for the Labour party in the UK depended on what one might call the liberal drag - a propensity to ramain within the gravitational field of liberal values and ambitions. True in the past and today: when the Labour party moves out of the liberal drag and too close to the other ideological force giving it shape — socialism — success wanes.

One might conclude that the success of modern (now defunct) social democracy was the result of liberal values superceeding those of totalitarian socialism, and non-totalitarian socialism providing facts and reasons for classical liberalism to embrace collective goals as integral part of the good society.

See also my The Paradox of Freedom, English and German.

[Geoffrey Hodgson diskutiert die These, wonach die britische Labour Partei immer dann Erfolg hatte, wenn sie unter dem Einfluss liberalen Denkens stand, und an Bedeutung verlor, wenn sie allzu stark in Richtung eines totalitären Sozialismus tendierte.

Man könnte daraus den Schluss ziehen, dass der Erfolg der modernen Sozialdemokratie, wie sie vielleicht noch bis Ende der 1980er Jahre im erklärten Selbstverständnis und in der Politik der SPD zu erkennen war, damit zu erklären sei, dass die aus dem Liberalismus auf sie wirkenden Einflüsse die Werte und Forderungen des totalitären Sozialismus in Schach halten konnten, während der nicht-totalitäre Sozialismus (Forderungen nach Sozialstaat etc.) den Liberalismus dadurch modernisierte, dass dieser lernte, bestimmte kollektive Ziele und Verfahren neben dem Schutz des Individuums als integralen Bestandteil einer Vision von der "guten Gesellschaft" anzuerkennen.]

Siehe auch meinen Vortrag Das Paradoxon der Freiheit.

On the Ambivalence of Government Spending

Image credit. The Cape of Good Hope - foundering or fulfilment of the journey.

Below is (1) a nice example of erroneous reasoning owing to a flawed understanding of the conditions of government spending, and (2) a good summary of the alternative view.

However; I disagree with the final proposition that seems to insinuate that the choice between government intervention and market solutions becomes only problematic under full resource utilisation (under full employment). 

Issues might arise where government competes with the private sector for scarce resources. That would occur at full employment if government wishes to continue to expand services.

While I am prepared to concede that any free marekt solution entails political decisions (favouring this party over another etc.) there is still a large difference between preponderantly market driven solutions and massive forms of state intervention. The latter, commanding more resources thanks to its coercive powers than private capital can afford to, may bring about enormously detrimental distortions to the economy and society at large, long before, in fact, irrespective of whether or not full factor utilisation is attained.

Properly controlled for injustice, (certain forms of) inequality etc. markets tend to have a socially beneficial advantage over market-ousting government interventions, especially in terms of efficiency. 

The left needs to be more aware of the reasons why markets are, not perfect, but still pretty good. The right needs to understand that markets are inevitably political and that for this reason we must strive for good politics. (Unfortunately, the right tends to favour markets over politics (i.e. democracy), while the left thinks that having good self-consciously progressive ideas and the state's oomph to implement them is a surer bet than cumbersome democracy.) What makes market-oriented policies good is, at the end of the day, good politics.

In the hands of left-oriented pundits, MMT insights are occasionally misused to nourish the "progressive" illusion that 

the good = an enticing wish + the power of the state (to implement it).

While the libertarian does not understand that "free markets" are tremendously political, involving a good deal of pre-economic positioning that conditions market outcomes, perhaps distorting them inordinately, the "progressive" lacks a sense of the danger of state power, unless government appears to be favouring "free markets". 

State intervention is political in nature, and so is the free market. Both are only as good as the politics that settles their contentious issues.

Paying for Medicare for All would require an increase in taxes — perhaps an earmarked progressive income tax for the purpose — but that increase would be offset by the elimination of premiums and out-of-pocket costs, and the slowing of inflation that stems from our market-based system. 

Angell buys into the false government as business or household analogy. Of course, a medical expert could not be expected to know the difference between an issuer of a sovereign currency like the USD and those who use the currency and must obtain it since they don't issue it.

The reality is the the federal government issues its currency and its cost of capital is zero, including interest payments if government chooses to include this even though it is not necessary operationally.

The only constraint is the availability of real resources. Public investment can augment real resources  through issuance at no cost of capital. As long as real resources are available for purchase in the currency they can be deployed. There is no affordability problem.

Issues might arise where government competes with the private sector for scarce resources. That would occur at full employment if government wishes to continue to expand services.

The source. 

[Das Zitat liefert ein anschauliches Beispiel dafür wie ein falsches Verständnis der Bedingungen für staatliche Resourcenverwendung (insbesondere ihrer Finanzierbarkeit) zu unzulässigen Schlussfolgerungen hinsichtlich der politischen Optionen führt, die ratsam sind und uns offen stehen. Darin ist die alternative Sichtweise der MMT gut und in aller Kürze dargestellt. Allerdings stimme ich mit der Schlussfolgerung im letzten Absatz nicht überein. Die Behauptung ist: In einer MMT-Welt, in der staatliche Ausgaben sehr viel umfangreicher im Sinne einer Vollbeschäftigungspolitik eingesetzt werden, als dies dem auf Austeriät getrimmten wirtschaftspolitischen Zeitgeist vertretbar erscheint, kämen Abwägungsentscheidungen zwischen marktorientierten und staatsinterventionistischen Projektvorhaben erst dann auf uns zu, wenn Vollbeschäftigung herrscht.

Ich glaube, MMT offeriert eine wichtige Erkenntnis, indem sie darauf hinweist, dass die Mittel des Staats Gutes zu tun, in einer Welt künstlicher Budget-Beschränkungen (wie sie z.B. der Maastrichter Vertrag oder der auf falscher Analogie mit privater Haushaltsführung beruhende Mythos vom ausgeglichenen Staatshaushalt verkörpern) längst nicht ausgeschöpft sind. Ich glaube auch, dass wir deshalb nicht genug tun, um für Vollbeschäftigung zu sorgen. Aber es ist dem Geist dieser Botschaft nicht dienlich, ein naives Verständnis "freier Märkte" durch ein naives Verständnis "staatlicher Interventionen" zu ersetzen. 

Massive Staatsinterventionen bergen ein sehr großes Gefahrenpotenzial, vor allem deshalb weil ihre Verdrängungskraft proportional zum Machtübergewicht des Staats gegenüber privaten Wirtschaftsteilnehmern ist. Wenn die Rationaliät und Disziplin des Marktlichen aus einem ganzen Industriezweig vertrieben werden durch rücksichtslose Ausübung staatlicher Übermacht im Dienste einer irrationalen politischen Mode, wie etwa im Fall der deutschen "Energiewende", kann sehr großer Schaden angerichtet werden, auch wenn die Kapazitätsgrenze der Wirtschaft noch längst nicht erreicht ist. Davor schon ist es möglich, eine ganze Gesellschaft auf schwerwiegende Fehlentwicklungen festzulegen, gesellschaftlichen Reichtum fehlzuleiten und lebenswichtige Gepflogenheiten der Offenheit in Politik, Wissenschaft und im wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb wegzudekretieren und ungute, "politisch korrekte", unfreitliche Traditionen an ihre Stelle zu setzen.

Guter Staatsinterventionismus unterliegt reger politischer Kritik und Kontrolle, die unermüdlich und Fall für Fall darum bemüht ist, zu klären, unter welchem Umständen marktliche Lösungen eher geeignet sind, und wann sie wirtschaftspolitischer Ergänzung bedürfen. Lange bevor die Kapazitätsgrenze der Wirtschaft erreicht ist stehen private und staatliche Ansätze in Konkurrenz zu einander und bedürfen intelligenter Abwägungsentscheidungen hinsichtlich ihrer relativen Vorteilhaftigkeit.

Einige Vertreter der MMT scheinen der Illusion zu unterliegen, dass (Staatsausgaben =) staatliche Projekte solange problemlos ausgeweitet werden dürfen, bis die Wirtschaft ihre Kapazitätsgrenze erreicht. Erst dann entstünde ernsthafte Gefahr, nämlich in Gestalt von Inflation.

Das ist falsch. MMT enthebt uns nicht der Notwendigkeit, Projekte sorgfältig zu prüfen, die Vor- und Nachteile eher marktlicher und eher interventionistischer Vorhaben nüchtern zu bewerten, um so nicht nur Fehler zu vermeiden, die unter dem trügerischen Namen "freie Marktwirtschaft" renommieren (obwohl sie auf politischen und nicht marktlich erspielten Vorteilen bestimmter Gruppen beruhen und zum Schaden der Allgemeinheit gereichen), sondern um auch schweren Irrtümern des Staatsinterventionismus vorzubeugen.]

See also Two Paradigmas — Adaptive Fiscal Space versus Compulsive Austerity

Einstein and Buddhism

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Buddhism is in vogue. 

I've grown sceptical of it. 

Buddhism strkes me as a form of escapism for centuries carefully nurtured by those in power and unwisely observed by the desparate.  (Consider the brutally repressive and inhumanely stratified nature of the societies in which Buddhism has developed.)

If you're going to be reasonably happy in life, you will have to strive for contentment in ways that the Buddhist denigrates as being "illusory" and unadvisedly down to earth.

In short: Buddhism('s promise of deliverance) is an illusion. 

No doubt, a reasonably satisfied life does depend on a lot of luck, all the same it will hardly happen unless you add a lot of worldly effort to the luck that comes your way.

My thoughts are inspired by this quote:

In another passage from 1934, Einstein talks about the value of a human being, reflecting a Buddhist-like approach:

“The true value of a human being is determined primarily by the measure and the sense in which he has attained liberation from the self”.

I don't know where Einstein gets his license to determine "the true value of a human being" and an objective and indiputable standard of "liberation", and one, into the bargain, that jettisons the self.

We may be part of a larger whole, however the conditions of human contentment are merely a small part of that whole. Human happiness doesn't partake in that whole, for it simply isn't linked to the larger multitude of the universum — like the fish in my pond that isn't linked to the chess game that I am playing while incidentally taking a look at it. And any claim of the existence of such linakge is an idle, highly implausible and unprovable assertion.  

Hence, similarly dubious is Einstein's below advice:

This theme of liberating the self is also echoed by Einstein later in life, in a 1950 letter to console a grieving father Robert S. Marcus:

“A human being is a part of the whole, called by us "Universe," a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something separate from the rest—a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. The striving to free oneself from this delusion is the one issue of true religion. Not to nourish it but to try to overcome it is the way to reach the attainable measure of peace of mind.”

 The source.

A Note Found on My Smart Phone

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While initially expecting evidence rejecting a politicised society, my research into the conditions of freedom evinced the surpising insight that a competitive political order is the most central feature of a free society. Thus, freedom is incapable of producing a uniform reading of freedom. First and foremost, she must provide for arrangements to accommodate her intrinsic plurality. I feel I need to stress this finding, considering the anti-democratic mood that seems to engulf people of the most different political leanings, nowadays perhaps more than in a long time. 

[Die Möglichkeit der Massenpartizipation am politischen Wettbewerb ist das wichtigste Merkmal der Freiheit. Die Abstimmungs-Balance, die sich daraus ergibt, dass jeder sich am politischen Geschäft beteiligen darf, definiert den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner der Freiheit. Demgegenüber ist es aussichtslos, sich von der Freiheit die Entstehung einer einheitlichen und geschlossenen Ideologie/Denkweise/politisch-weltanschaulichen Ausrichtung zu erwarten.] 

The hopes we have for freedom exhaust themselves when we achieve a successful balance between mass political competition with its tremendous potential for strife, on the one hand, and, on the other, peacable relations among the millions of free citizens competing for a mutually favourable relationship with their government.

Under feasible freedom, the voices of the malcontents testing the possibilities of a free society are likely to be louder and more numerous than those expressing satisfaction with the tumultuous best freedom can achieve.

[...]

Liberty is a composite of values. These values are contested and interpreted differentially by her constituents. Thus, inherently, liberty is perceived in ways that may at best represent a Wittgensteinian family resemblance.

"Wissen" — Neue Reihe an Posts über Erkenntnistheorie und Freiheit

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Ich kehre zu einem Projekt zurück, das ich vor geraumer Zeit begonnen habe. Ursprünglich hatte ich beabsichtigt, eine Gesamtdarstellung unseres Wissens über die Freiheit zu schreiben, und zwar aus liberaler Sicht. Im Laufe der Arbeit an diesem Projekt hat sich mein Freiheitsverständnis gewandelt. Der größte Unterschied zu meiner ursprünglichen Auffassung von Freiheit besteht darin, dass ich Freiheit inzwischen eher als eine Methode für die Entdeckung sinnvoller Bedingungen und Verfahrens des Miteinanders ansehe, denn als vorfahrtsberechtigte Deutung dessen, was eine gute Gesellschaft und ihre tragenden Komponenten (z.B. die Wirtschaft) ausmacht.  Um diese Erkenntnis einzufangen habe ich das Schlagwort von der Freiheit als Methode geprägt, von dem sich später herausstellen sollte, dass Walter Lippmann es bereits 1934 in seinem Buch "The Method of Freedom" benutzt hat, wohl aus einer Grundhaltung heraus, die nicht unähnlich derjenigen ist, die ich nach meiner Wandlung angenommen habe. 

Große Teile meines bis dahin in liberaler Gesinnung geschriebenen Buchs "Freiheit verstehen" wurden hinfällig, da mein darin vertretener Freiheitsbegriff auf die ideologischen Bedürfnisse des Liberalismus zugeschnitten war, vor allem in der Variante, wie sie Hayek vertrat. Was in dieser verworfenen Sichtweise auf die Freiheit vor allem irrig war, lässt sich zurückführen auf eine einseitige Auffassung dessen, was Hayek als spontane Ordnung bezeichnet.

In jeder menschlichen Ordnung, selbst in einer Zweierbeziehung, umso mehr in volkreichen Gesellschaften, bilden sich spontane Strukturen heraus, die nicht intendiert worden sind. Gemäß Hayekschem Liberalismus kann sich bei Anwendung geeigneter Verhaltensnormen eine spontane Ordnung herauskristallisieren, die dem entspricht, was Lippmann (später, nach einer zeitweiligen Bekehrung zum klassischen Liberalismus 1937) die "Good Society" genannt hat: nämlich den liberalen Traum einer eindeutig bestimmten Form von menschlichem Miteinander, die wünschenswerter ist, als jede Alternative. 

Genau an diesem Punkt weiche ich inzwischen vom Liberalismus ab. Denn ich glaube erkannt zu haben, dass die Fähigkeit, sich die spontane Ordnung einer Gesellschaft gezielt zunutze zu machen, also in sie einzugreifen, ebenso ein Teil dieser spontanen Ordnung und ihrer Produkte und Konsequenzen ist, wie ihre unbeabsichtigten Ergebnisse. Der Mensch hat gelernt, sich im Rahmen einer übergeordneten spontanen Ordnung, die sich um ihn herum ergibt und ihm somit gegeben ist, dennoch seine Kreativität und Zielstrebigkeit — sein Uhrmachertum, wenn man so will — wirksam werden zu lassen als weiteres Agens, welches die Gesamtordnung bestimmt. Dieser Aktivismus ist auch ein Evolutionsprodukt.

Die Zurückhaltung, genauer die Selektivität des Liberalismus in Sachen menschlicher Eingriffe in die Gesellschaft ist unsachgerecht. Nicht das Eingreifen in die Gesellschaft per se verdient mit einem Tabu belegt zu werden, sondern lediglich Formen der Intervention, die sich der Gewalt, der willkürlichen Aufbürdung und der Unterdrückung des geistigen Wettbewerbs der Menschen bedienen.

Der Freiheit, wie ich sie heute verstehe, liegt eine bestimmte Auffassung davon zugrunde, was Wissen ist, wie es gewonnen wird, welche Rolle es im Miteinander der Menschen spielt. Denn Freiheit als Methode ist nichts anderes als eine bestimmte Art, mit Wissen umzugehen. Damit hat sich das Kapitel "Wissen" aus dem Manuskript meines liberalen Buchs über die Freiheit eine Aktualität und Gültigkeit bewahrt, die ich in der folgenden Reihe an Posts würdigen möchte. 

Hier geht es zum Anfang der Reihe: "Wissen (1)"

Gone with the Wind ...

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... not quiet. But the wind is veering. 

More and more people

are becoming fed up and furious, and are now demanding an end to “pointless, subsidised wind power”.

 [...]

The reasons for the exploding resistance [against wind parks] are many and include destruction of forests, death to wildlife, blighting of the landscape, infrasound causing illnesses, high costs, technical inadequacy and grid instability, to name some. Probably no other product on the planet delivers so much misery for so little common benefit.

Wind energy opposition site “StopTheseThings” writes a couple of reports coming from Europe, which tell us of growing opposition to and serious health problems from wind energy. We are now witnessing how a rogue industry is well past its heyday.

It’s becoming increasingly clear that wind energy has gone from being welcome with open arms, to being furiously opposed. [The] only things keeping it afloat is special interest, junk science and corruption.

Under the auspices of fake emergency conditions (supposedly "deadly" global warming), green technologies have been forced upon us brutally and undemocratically, and thus the wind

industry had been used to getting its way by bulldozing over and marginalizing opposition and corrupting officials. 

But that strategy seems to be backfiring now, as StopTheseThings writes that “communities are as angry, if not angrier, than ever about the manner in which wind power outfits have ridden roughshod over their basic human rights – such as the right to sleep, live in and otherwise enjoy their family homes, free from incessant turbine generated low-frequency noise and infrasound – aided and abetted by a political ‘system’ that can be described as ‘crony capitalism’… ”

Recently there was a “monster Dublin protest” where “the leaders of community defence groups from all over Ireland descended on the Dáil Éireann to drive home their message – that wind power is a failed experiment and that these things do not work on any level: social, economic or environmental“.

The source.

Make a Pig of Yourself at a Dinner Party - What's Wrong with 'Green'

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Geologist Ian Plimer:

That is where I struck difficulty with the global warming movement: that there is a huge body of evidence — and that is mainly in life science / geology — that shows that the argument that human emissions of carbon-dioxide drive global warming is not substantiated by evidence. [Time marks 40:15 to 40:35, in the second video below]

In the below radio interview, which I find very substantial and persuasive, Plimer (between time marks 18:05 and 18:50) makes a point that to my flabbergasted incomprehension is never made even by sceptics [my comments in brackets, and my emphasis]:

There is a fundamental question that has never been answered ... Can you show me that the human emissions of carbon-dioxide drive global warming [—however, there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary, temperatures driving CO2 rather than the other way around]? Now, assume that I am wrong ... and that you can show me, then I ask you the supplementary question: ... The IPCC tells us that 97 % of carbon-dioxide emissions are natural [i.e. not caused by human beings]. Please show me that the 97 % of carbon-dioxide emissions from natural causes don't drive global warming. It's checkmate before the game starts."

There is far more CO2 being emitted by dying vegetation, volcanoes, animal flatulence and the oceans than by humans. Why is global warming supposed to be ended or satisfactorily controlled only if those 3% of all CO2 ascribable to human activities is subjected to a significant reduction? And in doing so preposterously one will have to eliminate a substantial part of that little portion of 3%, meaning bring human life as we know it to a standstill.

1 Year of Quaesivi

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One year ago I started this blog with an article entitled Government Spending Not Limited by Ability to Tax or Borrow - On MMT (1).

Iris Murdoch — Freedom, Patterns, and Love

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A philosopher and writer, below Iris Murdoch remarks on the relationship and the border line between the two realms.

I find her rather impressive and am looking forward to reading some of her fiction—she certainly is a good (moral) philosopher, as I seem to remember from reading her Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals.

In the interview, Iris Murdoch warns against muddling up literature and philosophy, by which latter she no doubt thinks of technical philosophy.

I am interested in the possibilities of literature as a platform for playing out intriguing philosophical themes and their weightier implications. Perhaps, I am not yet sufficiently clear as to what I mean by the—presumably non-technical—philosophical issues that may find a new lease of life or an enhanced stage in the sphere of literature.

A promising example that I can think of from the top of my head is a literary décor in which a protagonist (and only he, as opposed to everybody else) finds himself allowed to kill his fellow creatures with impunity. This should yield us quite a gripping knot of sociological, philosophical and psychological implications with stirring moral and other philosophical challenges and insights.

As for the interview, I was particularly struck by the following statement, beginning at time mark 07:50 (transcribed below up to 08:15), where Iris Murdoch suggests

... there is very, very little great art, and one reason for this is that both the artist and, of course, the consumer, too, as it were, seek too readily to be consoled ... some kind of appeasing or consoling pattern, sentimentality, would be one aspect of this, which, then prevents one from producing something which is got the kind of hardness and truthfulness which great art has got."

Minsky Revisited

Image credit.

Nick Johnson at The Political Economy of Development offers an excellent synopsis of the work of Hyman Minsky (Why Minsky Matters ...), to which I have added the following comment: 

Thanks for this excellent synopsis. 

I find Thomas Palley’s discussion of Minsky well worth reading, being at the same time appreciative of Minsky and a worthwhile extension of the latter’s work:

http://monthlyreview.org/2010/04/01/the-limits-of-minskys-financial-instability-hypothesis-as-an-explanation-of-the-crisis/

Also, I’m grappling with my thesis according to which Minsky’s instability thesis may have an analogue in the political cosmos.

Predicated on my (debatable) observation that political engagement and with it the challenging of the political establishment by oppositional forces is at an all time low (perhaps a uniquely German experience), I am inclined to surmise that political stability (which we certainly had for a very long time in post-war Germany) has created such a confidence in political management that people (still largely doing well and happy not to have to sacrifice free time to politics) increasingly lose their appetite for political resistance, thus encouraging and tolerating ever greater freedoms for the political caste, which is likely to lead to political excesses and ultimately to political instability.

The lack of oppositional oversight in Germany is frightening, there is none inside the country, and many momentous political decisions are taken care of in the anonymous corridors of EU institutions, which provide a strong leverage to the advantage of capital (“concentrated benefits, dispersed costs”) over labour in contemporary politics.

In a German post, I offer this discussion of Minsky and mehr.

FV (12) — Klassischer Liberalismus: tot oder lebendig?

 

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Über FV.


Klassischer Liberalismus – tot oder lebendig

An drei Fragen mag sich entscheiden, ob man den klassischen Liberalismus für tot oder für lebendig hält. Ich nenne sie die politischen Grundprobleme des klassischen Liberalismus.

Problem 1: Wenn es zur Sicherung der Freiheit des Staats bedarf, wenn der Staat sich nicht über freiwillige Zuwendungen finanzieren lässt, und ihm deshalb das Privileg der Steuererhebung eingeräumt wird, dann ist das System des klassischen Liberalismus in einen grundlegenden Widerspruch verwickelt. Denn Freiheit bedeutet Unabhängigkeit von Willkür. Doch das Besteuerungsprivileg gestattet es dem Staat Willkür zu üben, d.h. Menschen gegen deren Willen zum Mittel seiner Zwecke zu machen.

Problem 2: Vielleicht lässt sich Problem 1 so stark eingrenzen, d.h. die Ausübung von Willkür durch den Staat soweit einschränken, dass Steuern tatsächlich nur für Zwecke des Schutzes und der Förderung der Freiheit erhoben werden, so dass Problem 1 nur noch geringfügig und durchaus hinnehmbar ist. Damit ergibt sich aber

Problem 2: Ist es überhaupt möglich, die Willkürherrschaft des Staats angemessen einzuschränken?

Problem 3: Wenn Problem 1 und Problem 2 sich nicht überwinden lassen, ist es dann nicht so, dass Freiheit nur möglich ist, wenn sie sich ohne den Staat verwirklichen lässt? Problem 3 lautet daher: Wenn es ein sehr schwieriges und bestenfalls langwieriges, erst in ferner Zukunft zu erwartendes Unterfangen ist, Freiheit ohne den Staat herbeizuführen, oder wenn sich der Staat prinzipiell nicht ausschalten lässt, ist damit das Projekt des klassischen Liberalismus effektiv gescheitert?

Die Beantwortung dieser Frage hängt davon ab, ob man eine bei dieser Argumentation stillschweigend unterstellte Annahme akzeptiert oder ob man sie zurückweist.

Die Annahme lautet: Freiheit müsse selbsterzeugend sein können.

Erkennt man, dass diese Annahme falsch ist und daher fallen gelassen werden sollte, erweisen sich Probleme 1, 2 und 3 durchaus nicht als fatale Defekte des klassischen Liberalismus, sondern im Gegenteil als Gründe, die gerade für diese Doktrin sprechen, ihr Wert verleihen und ihre Notwendigkeit unterstreichen.

Nur eine Argumentationslogik, die die Freiheit – losgelöst von unabweisbaren empirischen Gegebenheiten – wie ein formales System zu behandeln trachtet, dessen wichtigstes Merkmal die innere Widerspruchsfreiheit ist, kann in Problemen 1, 2, und 3 einen schlagenden Beweis für die Unhaltbarkeit des klassischen Liberalismus sehen.

Freiheit ist aber immer die Umformung von Zuständen, Prozessen und Handlungsweisen, die außerhalb und unabhängig von der Freiheit herrschen und umgestaltet werden müssen, um der Freiheit einen Platz zwischen ihnen zu gewähren.

Zu diesen vorfreiheitlichen und freiheitlich zu gestaltenden Zuständen, Prozessen und Handlungsweisen zählen das politische Handeln, das Streben nach Macht und Vollzugsgewalt bei der Durchsetzung gesellschaftlich bindender Normen, die wettbewerbliche Bildung von Strukturen Maximaler Macht und das dabei unweigerlich sich abspielende Herauskristallisieren staatlicher Strukturen. Aus dem, was noch nicht Freiheit ist, gilt es Freiheit zu gewinnen. Und zwar nicht ein für allemal, sondern immerzu aufs Neue.

Probleme 1, 2 und 3 sind offene, immer aktuelle, stets im Einzelnen neu bestimmte Tagesordnungspunkte der Freiheit, sie beschreiben die wichtigsten Aufgaben im Pflichtenheft der Freiheit, die Herausforderungen, die Freiheit notwendig machen und ihre praktischen Aufgaben definieren.

Ob Problem 1, 2 und 3 den Tod des klassischen Liberalismus besiegeln oder ob sie im Gegenteil den vitalen Bedarf an ihm begründen, ist eine Frage des Standpunkts. Wer in der Freiheit einen endgültigen und vollendet erreichbaren Idealzustand sieht, der sich in einem widerspruchsfreien Formalismus abbilden lässt, muss den klassischen Liberalismus wohl als totgeboren verwerfen. Wer in der Freiheit einen fortlaufenden Anpassungs- und Annäherungsprozess erkennt, im Verlaufe dessen sich die Freiheit immerzu auf Neue durchsetzen muss gegenüber einer veränderlichen Umwelt, die angefüllt ist mit Interessen und Überzeugungen, von denen viele Freiheit ignorieren oder verneinen, der erfährt die lebendige Seite des klassischen Liberalismus.

Geschrieben im April 2013.

Englischer Zwillingsbeitrag.

UF (12) — Classical Liberalism: Dead or Alive?

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On UF.

Classical Liberalism – Dead or Alive?


Whether one is likely to consider classical liberalism to be dead or alive hinges on three questions that I tend to regard as the fundamental political problems that the doctrine is facing.


Problem 1: if the state is indispensable in order to secure liberty, and if the state cannot be financed by voluntary contributions, so that it must be granted the privilege of taxation, then classical liberalism finds itself entangled in a fundamental contradiction. After all, liberty is defined as the absence of arbitrariness. However, the privilege to tax empowers the state to act arbitrarily, i.e. to render a person, against her will, a means toward another party’s end.


Problem 2: perhaps problem 1, the exercise of arbitrary power by the state, can be confined to serving no other purpose than to secure and foster liberty, thus rendering problem 1 insignificant and acceptable. However, this gives rise to problem 2: is it possible at all to appropriately constrain the arbitrary rule of the state?


Problem 3: if problem 1 and problem 2 cannot be overcome, does this mean that liberty can only be achieved in the absence of the state? Therefore, problem 3 may be phrased in this manner: if the attainment of liberty under stateless conditions is likely to be highly difficult and at best a distant prospect or even an impossibility altogether, does this not imply the failure of classical liberalism?


The answer depends on whether or not one is accepting or rejecting an all-important tacit assumption: liberty must be able to generate herself.


Once it is recognised that this assumption is erroneous and therefore ought to be dropped, problem 1, 2, and 3 turn out not to be fatal flaws in the doctrine of classical liberalism at all; to the contrary, they provide grounds to support the doctrine, lending value to it and underscoring its cogency.


By contrast, problems 1, 2, and 3 appear fatally destructive of classical liberalism, if one subscribes to an argumentative logic that treats liberty like a formal system whose most important characteristic is consistency (i.e. the lack of logical contradictions), irrespective of insurmountable empirical facts that rule out such consistency.


Liberty is always a transformation of states, processes, and patterns of personal action that lie outside of or are independent of liberty, and hence must be altered to create room for freedom.


Amongst these states, processes, and patterns that antecede liberty and need to be shaped appropriately for freedom to emerge there are anthropological constants such as political action in all its forms, the search for power and enforcing authority to establish norms binding on society, the competitive evolution of structures of maximal power and the concomitant development of state structures. The inescapable challenge is to develop liberty out of what is not liberty yet. And this needs to be done not once and for all but again and again.


Problems 1, 2 und 3 are ever recurring to-do items on the agenda of freedom, the most important tasks in the product brief of freedom, the very challenges that create a demand for liberty and define her practical duties.


Whether problems 1, 2, and 3 put the final nail in the coffin of classical liberalism or whether they are sources of the vital need for it is a question of perspective. He who looks at liberty as being an ideal outcome that is capable of final and complete accomplishment and can be exactly mapped onto a consistent formal structure is apt to reject classical liberalism as a still-born doctrine.


He who views liberty as an ongoing process of adaptation and approximation in the course of which freedom must assert herself incessantly against a changing environment that is full of interests and convictions indifferent or antithetical to freedom, will be able to experience the life force of classical liberalism.


Written in April 2013


German twin post