Moral Objectivity (2)

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Continued from here.

The Epistemological Argument for Democracy

In A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, Hilary Putnam discusses

... a philosophical justification of democracy that I believe one can find in Dewey's work ...

[according to which:] ... Democracy is not just a form of social life among other workable forms of social life, it is the precondition for the full application of intelligence to the solution of social problems. (p. 180)

In its reach, this is a remarkable claim. For it does seem to contain the seeds of a scheme for the comparative determination of objectivity in moral matters. Remember, in Moral Objectivity (1), I rejected the notion of 

• objectivity (I) as irrefutable truth, emphasising instead

• objectivity (II) as the uniquely human capability of issuing inner states of consciousness so as to form objects of observation, contemplation, and criticism by other human beings. 

Much of the awareness of any other animal is trapped inside it, with no chance of being made available to other members of its species, no chance of being enhanced by the mentally processed experience of its fellow creatures, and no chance to contribute to such enhancement in conspecifics.

Objectivity (II) and Cultural Evolution

By contrast, objectivity (II) is the phenomenon whereby we render the subjective a public object, an object of inter-subjective perception, evaluation, paraphrase, interpretation and variation.

Objectivity (II) is the process that supports the mutation, selection, and variation of the subjective in public space, which is the beginning and fundamental principle of cultural evolution, creating a type of evolution entirely novel in at least two ways: (1) its gestation is hyper-fast compared to genetic evolution, and (2) it admits targeted experimentation, that is: man is no longer just the object of (genetic) evolution, man is empowered to use (cultural, later even genetic) evolution as a tool to further his own interests.

A sub-species of furthering his own interests is finding solutions to social problems. Therefore, what Putnam says of Dewey's conception of democracy would seem to imply that "full application of intelligence to the solution of social problems" is desirable, thereby presenting us with a moral standard against which we may judge the presence or extent of "moral objectivity."

For I take it that "solutions" are desirable, and if they are, then "the full application" of a means ("intelligence") to attaining solutions may arguably be considered desirable.

If this turns out to be so, and if this reasoning can be successfully defended, we stand a good chance to cull moral values and facts, certain moral constants and kernels from the operative scaffolding of the democratic process. That is to say, in order for the process of finding solutions to run as (we think) it should, we are operatively required to see certain preconditions fulfilled, which we may formulate in terms of moral preferences, perhaps like free speech or a prohibition to exclude anyone from the right to engage in research etc. 

Interestingly, from this angle we see a double similarity emerge between the ethical process of democracy and the processes by which science advances. For science to elicit certain desirable outcomes it depends on assumptions and practices that can be formulated in valorising terms — by valorisation I mean the attachment of value(s) so as to mark out desiderata. In science no less than in ethics, valorisation depends on choices reflecting differing perspectives. One of the reasons why science is no trivial pursuit is that the scientist has to make difficult choices, many of which can be thought of as anticipations of or other reactions to deviant choices other scientists may be inclined to make or have made, say, concerning the degree to which incumbent theory is to be maintained or repudiated in order to improve on a given theory.

 

Similarities between Science and Ethics - Valorisation and Organised Pluralism

So, both science and ethics are pluralistic in terms of valorisation. The first similarity between science and ethics is that both depend on valorisation, which implies pluralism. For if valorising is part of science and ethics, and valorisation is sensitive to perspective, and the participants in science and ethics take different perspectives, than science and ethics are to all intents and purposes pluralistic enterprises. 

This brings up the second similarity between science and ethics: both need to organise, manage, regulate the pluralism that the valorising agents engage in. That is a tremendously complicated affair, which I cannot begin to do justice to in this post; but I can say so much: in order to organise, defend and develop practical/operative and evaluative standards for the processes constituting science and ethical projects like democracy we depend on a scaffolding of interacting and mutually adjusting values.

We may disagree on the values, their desirability and consequences but in practising science and ethics we will always move within a scaffolding made up of such values.

Hence, all of the key terms mentioned above ("solutions" etc.) are subject to controversial interpretation: one may disagree as to what counts as a "solution" and what not, whether a "solution" is good or less so, and, by implication, challenge the claims that the "full application of intelligence" is in principle or in a given case acceptable. However, the point is, we have found a standard that should help us in making more precise the meaning of moral objectivity, and the credibility of the concept or the criticisms directed at it. 

The important lesson here is: it is an arrogant conceit to assume that there is a strict dichotomy between facts—the august realm of hallowed science—and values—the dubious paraphernalia of messy ethics—and that serious efforts at truth, or shall we say, important and meaningful solutions, may be expected from the former yet not of the latter.

Continued here.