Misunderstanding Liberalism (1) — State, Individual, Constitution, Democracy and Self-Interest

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In a quaint alliance, both adepts and detractors of classical liberalism—by misreading it— have built a public image for the venerable school of thought that makes it insupportable to most people. 

Among the cornerstones of the distorted reading of classical liberalism we find

the purported irreconcilability

between 

• (1) the state and the individual, and derivatively,

between

• (2) constitutional restraint and democracy (unhampered self-rule), and

between

• (3) public purpose and self-interest.

(1) The State and the Individual

In the popular reading, liberalism is based on the idea of a fundamental rivalry between the state and the individual. The state is the natural enemy of the freedom-seeking individual.  

It is thought that classical liberalism conceives of the state as the Leviathan, a man devouring monster, which must be firmly tied down lest it develop inordinate abusive powers—which is the meaning of negative constitutionalism according to which a constitution has the negative purpose of incapacitating the powers of the state to a manageably low level. 

While it is true that, according to the liberal vision, coercive constraints must be placed on the state, what is left out of the picture is that liberalism adheres to a wider concept of the constitution, following the insights of what might be called positive constitutionalism: binding the state to certain restrictions is a means to making it strong enough so it is able to defend and administer freedom. No less than a totally unconstrained individual, the state will end up weak and out of control unless it finds orientation in principles that reign it in, channelling arbitrary and diffuse powers into orderly and well-monitored streams of dedicated energy.

In short: classical liberalism favours a strong state, and believes that the only way to build a sufficiently powerful government is to subject it to appropriate rules.

I have substantially expanded on this theme here.

(2) Constitutional Restraint and Democracy

Liberals worry that majoritarian rule may sweep away the rights of freedom. Their opponents accuse liberals of being inimical toward democracy, hampering the self-rule of the people.  

In actual fact, the true attitude of the classical liberals toward popular self-rule must be seen as a special case of positive constitutionalism. In order to enjoy the benefits of democracy, it is necessary to restrain the demos in exercising its democratic power. We are not dealing with the rejection of democracy but with a realistic philosophy aimed at ensuring conditions under which popular self-rule will be as conducive as it possibly can. As with the state, the idea is to strengthen democracy by restricting it.

If participation of the broad populace and the expression of its will are to serve as systematically constructive contributions to the public purpose we need to curb the exuberant, disorderly spontaneous exercise of self-government, and make it subject to rules that accord with the agreed principles of the common weal. In no other way is its conceivable to ever approximate outcomes that may be characterised as truly democratic. We do not condone the lynching of a person on the grounds that a majority has decided to kill him in an act of direct democracy, in an act of unrestrained self-rule by the majority. And in a populous society, the majority of people will not recognise the purposes that they support in majoritarian decisions unless these bear a reasonable relation with constraining principles. Or else Robespierre will rule.

The genuine impetus of classical liberalism is deeply democratic—after all, it is the philosophy that demands the emancipation of the individual, which is tantamount to political freedom for every citizen.

(3) Public Purpose and Self-Interest 

Perhaps the most common accusation levelled against the liberal tradition is that it relies on "rugged individualism," that it campaigns for the pursuit of egregious self-interest. 

It should stand to reason by now, the classical liberal's commitment to positive constitutionalism, political freedom and democracy clearly militates against her putative sympathies for inconsiderate individualism.

To put the issue into perspective, it is indispensable to consider the historical context in which the liberal emphasis on self-interest had arisen. Unlike its caricature in modern neoclassical economics, the classical liberals did not regard the human being as the epitome of rationality. They were strongly impressed by a world in which human passions and emotional excesses were at least as dominant a feature of life as  the results of cold human calculation. Think of the the Thirty Years' war (1618-1648). Religious wars and the blind hatred between rivalrous factions, the cruel indifference to the fate of those outside one's own narrow circle—the world from which liberalism sought deliverance was chock full with human behaviour governed by unmitigated passions. The starting point of liberalism was a differentiated analysis of human nature allowing for the enormous destructive potential of our species, and the task therefore was to create institutions and conditions that were capable of taming destructiveness and transforming it benignly, and open up outlets for the good and constructive in the human being.  

It is in this context that liberalism would become interested in human egotism. Self-regard is a force within the human being that is naturally capable of orderly effects and productive outcomes. It induces the person to think and calculate and consider consequences beyond the first step. Self-interest has the potential of self-restraint and mutual considerateness. Of course, it needs to be accompanied by other institutions such as positive constitutionalism and democracy to create an all-embracing, cohesive, and resilient network of incentives that tends to bring together isolated individuals in a new form of community, the brotherhood of self-interested individuals. Only on the basis of considered self-regard can there ever be a society in which people are willing to accept the new phenomenon of a peaceful public. This is how self-interest ties in with constitutional restraint, a strong state dedicated to the public purpose, and democracy, as being the expression of a people committed to allow each member of society to add the requirements of her self-regard to communal decision-making. 

Classical Liberalism — A Progressive Tradition

The fundamentals of this tradition do not point toward anything like a political philosophy embodied in certain variants of liberalism that espouse the

• primacy of commercial relations in ordering society (market fundamentalism), or the 

• denigration of societal design effected by political participation (anti-democratism), or the 

• rejection of collectively organised human compassion and social welfare (opposition to the welfare state).  

Social democracy of the type prevalent in the 20th century appears to be the logical extension of 18th century's classical liberalism. While the latter did not prove viable after the mid-19th century, owing to the very misunderstandings explained in this post—see especially the last three bullet points above— social democracy is in danger of losing its identity and cultural dominance if it gives up its classical liberal moorings as appears to have been increasingly the case in the last decade or two.

See also The Paradox of Freedom, The State, Das Paradoxon der Freiheit, Toward a Theory of Feasible Freedom (5.1 Lessons for Freedom), and Negotiable Freedom.

Continued here.