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From the draft of an unpublished paper - the follow up to The Paradox of Freedom. Austrian Thought and the Crisis of Liberalism - that I have recently presented at a Conference on immigration at the University of Witten/Herdecke:
1.0 Classical Liberalism, Feasible Freedom, and Immigration Politics in the US (1776 – 1900)
While the classical liberal tradition
from Locke to Hayek is united by an emphasis on the self-organising
features of free societies, it entirely fails to account for politics
and the state as a spontaneous order, thus missing the political nature
of liberty. Hayek correctly describes economic competition as a
discovery procedure, yet neglects to appreciate that politics too is a
discovery procedure, in the absence of which freedom is impossible.
Thus, owing to an inability to understand that political practices and
institutions lie at the heart of freedom, classical liberalism suffers
from nothing less than a misconception of her central value, its
normative vision of liberty being blind to the conditions of feasible
freedom.
In this paper we wish to highlight some
of the pivotal features of freedom overlooked by classical liberalism
and sketch the contours of a theory of feasible freedom. To this
purpose, we are drawing upon evidence from immigration politics as it
was to unfold during the first 120 years after the founding of the
United States of America. The history of the new American republic,
which was strongly inspired by the ideas of classical liberalism,
promises to yield interesting insights into the advancement of feasible
freedom.
2.0 Trend Finding (1776 - 1800) – Political Competition as a Discovery Process
“Americans have been ambivalent about
immigration since the earliest days of their republic. The founding
generation grew up in British North American colonies that had
contrasting traditions of governing European immigration. Some colonies
were routinely hostile to outsiders; some granted entry and equal
membership to immigrants who shared their ecclesiastical goals; some
recruited immigrant labor but limited the rights newcomers enjoyed; and
still others extended generous terms of immigration and membership to
all white male settlers […]” (p.49f.)
This and
all subsequent page references in the present selective draft paper
refer to Tichenor, D.J. (2002), Dividing Lines. The Politics of
Immigration Control in America, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton
Paperbacks.
In 1781, Thomas Jefferson expressed
apprehension about European immigration doubting that newcomers would be
able to renounce their Old World loyalties to “absolute monarchy.” He
did not believe that new waves of immigrants were capable of honouring
republican principles, individual liberty and self-government. In order
to avert the danger, he advocated constraints on future admissions.
By contrast, Thomas Paine urged “the
nation to adopt the cosmopolitan individualism of Pennsylvania, where
the equal membership of English, Dutch, Germans and Swedes showed that
.” (p.51). Paine’s universalist
cosmopolitanism was echoed in George Washington’s pronouncement of 1783
that “America is open to receive not only the Opulent and respectable
Stranger, but the oppressed and persecuted of all Nations and
Religions.” (p.51)
In a summer of closed meetings in
Philadelphia, when America’s leading statesmen were deliberating the
Constitution which they finally published in the same year on September
17, 1787, the debate revealed significant differences of opinion and
among them also rather ambiguous positions. George Mason, for instance,
hailed the economic benefits of alien labour, while opposing broad
political rights to “foreigners and adventurers.” (p.52) By contrast,
James Madison was worried that denial of public office to immigrants
would “give a tincture of illiberality to the Constitution.” (p.52). In
the end, the delegates to the convention struck a compromise by
determining the foreign-born to be ineligible only for the presidency,
while resolving on modest residency requirements for congressional
office. (p.52)
The framers did not touch on the subject
of immigration in the text of the Constitution (except indirectly, as
noted above). It was wise of them not to prejudge the issue, as, we
conjecture, their restraint kept the political discovery process open, a
condition vital to political stability in the early years of the new
republic. At the time, however, the founding fathers had tactical
options to consider. To all intents and purposes, practical immigration
issues were handled by the states, which the framers did not wish to
alienate by pre-emptive constitutional determinations. Also, it appears,
in remaining seemingly neutral, they effectively relied on the
expectation that the states would continue to pursue policies of
pragmatic leniency toward immigrants. Only a few years later, the first
Congress in 1790 enacted a uniform rule of naturalization that made
citizenship very easy to acquire for European men. It provided that
who resided in the United States for as
little as two years could be naturalized by (p.53)
At once, the restrictionists prepared to
strike back. During the 1790s, the atmosphere for immigration grew
inclement. The Anglo-French conflict fuelled support for restrictionist
demands. One of the two leading parties at the time, the Federalists
denounced French and Irish immigrants for putatively aligning themselves
with the ideals of the French Revolution and fostering factionalism by
participating in democratic clubs. What is more, the Federalists were
alerted by the fact that in large cities, Irish and other immigrants
would tend to cast their votes in favour of the other large party: the
Democratic Republicans. Thus, taking advantage of congressional
majorities, the Federalists enacted laws curbing access of European
aliens to citizenship and enfranchisement. In 1798, Congress passed the
Alien and Sedition Acts which increased the residency requirement for
eligibility to citizenship to 14 years, and allowed the president to
imprison or deport aliens considered "dangerous to the peace and safety
of the United States" at any time. An effort at forestalling the
political decline of the Federalists, the Acts did not have the intended
effect, and strengthened the bond between foreign-born voters and the
Democratic-Republican party. With their help, Jefferson won the
presidential election in 1800, and proceeded quickly to rescind the
restrictionist legislation of the Federalists. He presided over the
return of control of alien admissions to the states and the restoration
of generous conditions of naturalisation. Once a man of nativist
inclinations, Jefferson emerged as a staunch defender of the rights of
white male immigrants, cementing the pro-immigration trend of the 18th
century and handing a structure of expansionist path dependency on to
the new century.
The political search for a dominant
trend was accompanied by uncertainty and erratic turns. By the
late-eighteenth century, however, compelling circumstances and pragmatic
considerations predisposed a preponderance of political forces to
embrace European immigration: (1) a paucity of labour, (2) abundant
territory and (3) a vibrant desire for rapid settlement and economic
development along the advancing frontiers of the United States.
Jefferson and other leading political
figures, such as Benjamin Franklin, betrayed duplicity, opportunism and
even full reversal of opinion in the matter of immigration. Why? The
political discovery process of a free society confronted them with new
evidence, forcing them to learn and adjust their public-facing agendas.
Continued here.
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