Politics - 3 - [Draft]*

Image credit.

Continued from here.


§ 4 — From Anthropocentric Freedom to Sociogenic Freedom

Freedom in the modern sense arises from new ways of mitigating the tension between

• (a) man's innate disposition to act in ways determined by his own volition, and 

• (b) the social limits imposed on personal latitude sought by the individual. 

Prior to the spread of freedom in its contemporary form, society is largely characterised by severe and extensive repression of the anthropocentric freedoms of the population by a ruling elite supported by grossly anti-egalitarian cultural arrangements.

Modern freedom seeks a more even and inclusive dispersion among all members of the population of the right and the ability to pursue anthropocentric freedom. Under conditions of modern freedom,

options of freedom available to the individual are

• socially generated (sociogenic) by observance of rules applicable to all, as opposed to being 

while prior to the emergence of sociogenic conditions, options for the pursuit of free action are

• centred in personal impulse and interest (anthropocentric), depending for their exertion on uneven advantages of power and status, and for most people on luck, covertness, cunning, or the absence of social resistance vis-à-vis personal impulse.

Under sociogenic freedom there is a deliberate, systematic, and socially enforced presumption in favour of

• (i) increasing freedom for all, and 

• (ii) limiting freedom only to promote 

(a) the equitable dispersion of personal freedom (e.g. equal legal rights), or

(b) other objectives designed to support forms of equality among citizens deemed fair and productive (the common good, equality of opportunity, equality of benefit-and-burden in taxation through progression etc).

Continued here.

'The Political Habitus' and Dewey's Theory of Democracy — A Note

Image credit. Nature painting itself. Paintings of nature by nature through human means.

I have argued here that what I call "the political habitus" is a "pre-political" condition of politics in a free society. In short, in an individualist age, men get used to acting in ways that are political in nature, while conduct pursued in this vein may largely take place outside—and prior to the establishment—of a democratic political infrastructure.

Broadly speaking, I see individualism as one of the most momentous consequences of the ongoing differentiation of the division of labour among human beings. A historical force to emerge slowly but relentlessly, only later does individualism become an objective of political ambition as we are accustomed to see it. In the meantime, the fait accompli of increasingly individualistic patterns of human cooperation forces a trail of adaptations to the irresistible paradigmatic thrust of individualism, one of which being a new political style: the trend toward more inclusive politics and— ultimately—democracy as we have come to know it. 

The genesis of freedom has its moments of sudden advances, but these are mostly undergirded by slow, even glacial streams of preparatory development like that process lasting a thousand years whereby the individualistic revolution instigated by Jesus of Nazareth and St. Paul would work its way into full bloom, albeit ultimately on secular terms.

John Dewey draws attention to another of these subtle and stealthy processes that continually nurture some of the most decisive, yet hardly noted, cultural paraphernalia of greater freedom. From his unique angle, Dewey confirms my view that — my interpretation — democracy

• (a) must not be reduced to a few signal events, most notably elections, but 

• (b) consists of a way of life which forms a cultural texture permeating the habits and daily practices of an entire society and its population, a texture that

• (c) (i) originates and (ii) grows culturally preponderant until it becomes the dominant political paradigm and from then on (iii) continues to take place to a large extent

                 outside of the institutions expressly designed to support political action.

In fact, this "pre-political" texture makes up the substratum that supports the political order. 

Below I quote from an article written by Axel Honneth: Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today.

Honneth discusses various conceptions of democracy, of which I shall single out only the liberal variant, to contrast them with Dewey's view.

The core of all radical democratic objections leveled [sic] against liberalism's understanding of democracy has referred to its negative, individualistic conception of personal freedom.

[ ... T]he central argument has always been that in the liberal understanding ... [ "of," I suppose, should be eliminated, cf p. 766] the formation of the democratic, political will could be reduced to the function of periodically legitimating state action.

Here the subject is understood as previously furnished with a certain amount of personal freedom; and if the personal autonomy of the individual is understood as independent of the processes of social integration, this entails the following normative conclusion: The political activity of citizens must consist primarily in the regular control of a state apparatus whose essential task must, for its part, be the protection of their individual liberties. (Ibid. p. 766)

Honneth is putting his finger on it: in the liberal account, freedom, and derivatively, the pertinence of democracy or, shall we say, the right pursuit of democratic practices, are being plucked out of the air, conjured into existence as ultimate facts, as God-given or nature-given or logically irreducible axioms, as first principles of eternal existence. Freedom and democracy are not seen as embedded in the social world from which spring the experiences that orient human action and motivate our attitudes toward political categories.

This, of course, explains why liberals fail to appreciate the social character of individualism, thus completely missing its dynamic dimension whereby the exchange and competition of different interests and views keep shaping the meaning of freedom and the forms in which she gains a foothold in the real world.

By contrast, John Dewey offers a perspective on democracy that does account for its place in the social world.

Honneth argues that Dewey is able

[...] to grasp democratic ethical life as the outcome of the experience that all members of society could have if they related to one another cooperatively through a just organizing of the division of labor. (p. 780)

By a  

[...] one-sided restriction of democracy to the political sphere [as in authors such as Habermas] .. one loses sight of the fact that a democratic public sphere lives off social presuppositions that can be secured only outside this idea itself; it must expect each citizen to share so much common ground with all others that at least an interest can emerge in involving oneself actively in political affairs. However, such a degree of common ground can evolve only where, in the prepolitical domain, it has already been possible  to experience communicative relatedness; and this vacant spot in a politically one-sided theory of democracy is filled, in my view, by Dewey's idea of social cooperation, that is, of a division of labor under conditions of justice. (p. 779)

Smooth Rapture

Image credit.

Smooth rapture — ah, the cello, that naturally elegiacal instrument with its close affinity to the human voice. When I hear a cello, I inadvertently descend into a ponderous mood — mind you, not so with the below piece.

Politics - 2 - [Draft]*

Image credit.

Continued from here.

§ 3 — The political anthropology of freedom

Individualism is a copious resource for mankind which has lain dormant for millions of years. Freedom is the mode of operation that man has chanced upon to be able to make the fullest use of the dormant potential of individualism.

As a prolegomenon (preface) to a theory of politics under conditions of freedom, I shall lay out the anthropological framework of the political propensities of human beings, in the course of which I explain

• why man is a naturally individualistic being, 

• why her individualism can flourish only under conditions suited to her social nature and needs, and 

• why it has taken a long time and very special conditions to create a social environment in which it is possible to lift the potential of individualism.

Freedom may be regarded as a state of affairs such that the individualistic potential of humans is brought into balance — to a greater extent than ever — with our inescapable dependence on social ties and social considerations. Politics, being a discovery procedure with full public participation, is a key part of the heuristic apparatus by which we ascertain the conditions of this balance.

Freedom is a platform for productive individualism, which latter is a socially embedded phenomenon, that is to say: the conditions of individualism are not themselves of an individualistic nature. Rather than being causally rooted in needs and desires and other supposed or attained entitlements of the individual, the conditions of individualism represent first and foremost a matrix of social relationships, being derived from and dependent on collective arrangements.    

Continued here.

Politics - 1 - [Draft]*

Image credit. This 19th century painting combines all the elements that are characteristic of politics. For I contend that acting politically amounts to monitoring, challenging, and persuading one another, with a view to maintaining or changing the standards of admissible social behaviour that govern a community of two or more human beings.

§ 1 Freedom — The Most Politicised Stage in Human Development

Freedom is a political phenomenon. Being an adaptation to the historical trend of individualism, freedom depends on the possibility of voluntary participation by every mature member of society in the processes of public decision making. What is more, in her everyday life in a free society, the individual constantly acts as a political agent in the sense that freedom accords her an unprecedented range of options to influence and alter socially accepted behaviour. Thus freedom is in at least two respects the most politicised stage in human development: 

in a free society, 

• (a)  the formal political order is geared to mass political participation, and 

• (b)  the individual is empowered to affect society in ways that previously were either (a) non-existent, inconceivable, placed under taboo, actively precluded, or (b) reserved to a small political elite.

§ 2 The Definition of Politics

We shall distinguish between politics in a wider and in a narrower sense. 

Politics in a Wider Sense

Politics in a wider sense is any effort to make one's social environment comply with one's needs. That would even include bilateral influencing, as in a situation where a spouse is trying to get his partner to accept his demands/desire—say, to attend a sports event rather than go to the opera. So, there are good grounds why we would refer to certain private activities in small groups or even bilateral relationships as "practising politics". 

Politics in a Narrower Sense

But, of course, this is not the sense in which we more ordinarily speak of politics. Politics in a narrower sense suggests the idea that people try to make an impact on what counts as acceptable, commendable or enforceable behaviour in a community, usually understood to be of rather large a size, even an entire nation made up of millions of people.

A General Definition of Politics

Human beings are social creatures that cannot survive without embarking on the kind of interaction with other members of their species that is aimed at and results in taking influence on one another.

Therefore, engaging in political activity is an anthropological constant, a trait of human conduct that is tied to the human being as an existential prerequisite.

We may, therefore, give the following general definition of politics, covering both its wider and its narrower denotation:

Politics is the exertion of influence of humans on one another—by force, stratagem or persuasion—with the purpose of establishing in a community the validity of certain rules and options for action, ensuring the admissibility, endorsement, toleration or enforcement of certain decisions, customs, habits, convictions and interests, including established and novel rights.

Politics, then, may be characterised as the type of behaviour that is directed toward achieving acceptance—in a social unit or social relationship—of certain expectations embodied in norms, status, and compliant action.

If A bows his head and doffs his hat to B, while the latter is not deigning to look at A, this may be interpreted as a result of politics.

A is complying with an accepted expectation embodied in 

• the rule (norm) that 

• a man of lowly rank (status) is supposed 

• to demonstrate respect (compliant action)

• for a higher-ranking member (status) of the community.

 ★

Despite the general and timeless aspects captured by politics in a wider and narrower sense, politics undergoes a sea-change under the influence of freedom. There are, then, distinct meanings of politics before and after the emergence of free societies. This difference only underscores that it is politics that lends freedom its distinct character. 

However, before turning to the unique features of politics under conditions of freedom, I shall take a closer look at the anthropological foundations of the political disposition in humans. This will help explain how political behaviour is intrinsic to the human condition in a way that renders freedom a project of great political indeterminacy, whose outcomes are impossible to predict and resist capture by any single ideology.

Having established the central and in many respects invariant role assumed by politics in the human condition, I shall be able to spell out more fully my contention that freedom is the most eminently political stage in the development of human society.

Continued here.

Moral Objectivity (2)

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Continued from here.

The Epistemological Argument for Democracy

In A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, Hilary Putnam discusses

... a philosophical justification of democracy that I believe one can find in Dewey's work ...

[according to which:] ... Democracy is not just a form of social life among other workable forms of social life, it is the precondition for the full application of intelligence to the solution of social problems. (p. 180)

In its reach, this is a remarkable claim. For it does seem to contain the seeds of a scheme for the comparative determination of objectivity in moral matters. Remember, in Moral Objectivity (1), I rejected the notion of 

• objectivity (I) as irrefutable truth, emphasising instead

• objectivity (II) as the uniquely human capability of issuing inner states of consciousness so as to form objects of observation, contemplation, and criticism by other human beings. 

Much of the awareness of any other animal is trapped inside it, with no chance of being made available to other members of its species, no chance of being enhanced by the mentally processed experience of its fellow creatures, and no chance to contribute to such enhancement in conspecifics.

Objectivity (II) and Cultural Evolution

By contrast, objectivity (II) is the phenomenon whereby we render the subjective a public object, an object of inter-subjective perception, evaluation, paraphrase, interpretation and variation.

Objectivity (II) is the process that supports the mutation, selection, and variation of the subjective in public space, which is the beginning and fundamental principle of cultural evolution, creating a type of evolution entirely novel in at least two ways: (1) its gestation is hyper-fast compared to genetic evolution, and (2) it admits targeted experimentation, that is: man is no longer just the object of (genetic) evolution, man is empowered to use (cultural, later even genetic) evolution as a tool to further his own interests.

A sub-species of furthering his own interests is finding solutions to social problems. Therefore, what Putnam says of Dewey's conception of democracy would seem to imply that "full application of intelligence to the solution of social problems" is desirable, thereby presenting us with a moral standard against which we may judge the presence or extent of "moral objectivity."

For I take it that "solutions" are desirable, and if they are, then "the full application" of a means ("intelligence") to attaining solutions may arguably be considered desirable.

If this turns out to be so, and if this reasoning can be successfully defended, we stand a good chance to cull moral values and facts, certain moral constants and kernels from the operative scaffolding of the democratic process. That is to say, in order for the process of finding solutions to run as (we think) it should, we are operatively required to see certain preconditions fulfilled, which we may formulate in terms of moral preferences, perhaps like free speech or a prohibition to exclude anyone from the right to engage in research etc. 

Interestingly, from this angle we see a double similarity emerge between the ethical process of democracy and the processes by which science advances. For science to elicit certain desirable outcomes it depends on assumptions and practices that can be formulated in valorising terms — by valorisation I mean the attachment of value(s) so as to mark out desiderata. In science no less than in ethics, valorisation depends on choices reflecting differing perspectives. One of the reasons why science is no trivial pursuit is that the scientist has to make difficult choices, many of which can be thought of as anticipations of or other reactions to deviant choices other scientists may be inclined to make or have made, say, concerning the degree to which incumbent theory is to be maintained or repudiated in order to improve on a given theory.

 

Similarities between Science and Ethics - Valorisation and Organised Pluralism

So, both science and ethics are pluralistic in terms of valorisation. The first similarity between science and ethics is that both depend on valorisation, which implies pluralism. For if valorising is part of science and ethics, and valorisation is sensitive to perspective, and the participants in science and ethics take different perspectives, than science and ethics are to all intents and purposes pluralistic enterprises. 

This brings up the second similarity between science and ethics: both need to organise, manage, regulate the pluralism that the valorising agents engage in. That is a tremendously complicated affair, which I cannot begin to do justice to in this post; but I can say so much: in order to organise, defend and develop practical/operative and evaluative standards for the processes constituting science and ethical projects like democracy we depend on a scaffolding of interacting and mutually adjusting values.

We may disagree on the values, their desirability and consequences but in practising science and ethics we will always move within a scaffolding made up of such values.

Hence, all of the key terms mentioned above ("solutions" etc.) are subject to controversial interpretation: one may disagree as to what counts as a "solution" and what not, whether a "solution" is good or less so, and, by implication, challenge the claims that the "full application of intelligence" is in principle or in a given case acceptable. However, the point is, we have found a standard that should help us in making more precise the meaning of moral objectivity, and the credibility of the concept or the criticisms directed at it. 

The important lesson here is: it is an arrogant conceit to assume that there is a strict dichotomy between facts—the august realm of hallowed science—and values—the dubious paraphernalia of messy ethics—and that serious efforts at truth, or shall we say, important and meaningful solutions, may be expected from the former yet not of the latter.

Continued here.

Quote of the Day — Rabbi Zusahia on The Judgement of His Maker

Image credit.

"Individualism" is not the name of one single thing, and some of the ideas that go under the name of individualism are to be cherished. For example, individualism can mean, simply, the idea that individuality is precious—even sacred.

In the Jewish tradition, one often quotes the parable about Rabbi Zusiah, who, on his death bed, told his grieving disciples that he was terrified of the judgement of his Maker.

"But you are a holy man," the disciples protested.

"You have been as faithful as Abraham; you have been as holy as Moses; you have been as learned as Hillel."

"The Lord is not going to ask me, 'Have you been Abraham?' 'Have you been Moses?' or 'Have you been Hillel?'" was the sage's reply.

"The Lord is going to ask me 'Have you been Zusiah?'"

Quoted from Words and Life by Hilary Putnam, p. 187

Moral Objectivity (1)

Image credit.

A dialogue between the philosopher Karl Popper and a salesgirls at a bakery (apocryphal):

— All knowledge is conjectural knowledge.

— That you know for sure, right? 

Dialog zwischem dem Philosophen Karl Popper und der Verkäuferin in einer Bäckerei:

— Alles Wissen ist nur Vermutungswissen.

— Das wissen Sie aber. 

Dialohg zwieschn dehm Filosohfn Koal Bopper (Österreichisch) und de Fekäuferin innerre Backstubb (Pfälzisch)

— Ohles Wiessn iss nua Feamuhtungswiessn. (Österreichischer Akzent)

— Unn dess wisse Se abbeh, (Pfälzischer Akzent)

Science Is Not "Objective I" — Science Is "Objective II" and So Is Ethics

Are moral judgements "merely" subjective? Is objectivity a feature reserved to science and unknown in ethics? If so, why should the supposed difference matter? 

My tentative answer: ultimately, what objectivity ("objective II") means is that we humans, in contrast to other animals, are capable of making our thoughts and inner subjective experience the object of empathy, comment and evaluation by other humans.

That turns out to be a powerful advantage over other animals in terms of learning more about and instrumentalising our environment.

But that by itself does not make objectivity ("objective I") what it appears to be in accounts of crude popularisation: indubitable knowledge, unassailable truth.  

In fact, to all intents and purposes, most of our knowledge of the experienceable world seems to be provisional, subject to revision.

We do not have a general criterion by which we would be able to discern truth from non-truth. We have to find out case by case—each time anew—adapting our methods of corroboration to changing circumstances and elusive evidence.

There is no such thing as an algorithm detecting truth whenever it is to be had.

We do not have recourse to a truth-finding machine, automatically sucking up "the truth of the matter" subsequent to having cleansed it—fully and for good—from untruthful dust and debris.

We can assure ourselves only of verisimilitude (a similarity to truth), for there is no guarantee that observation-based conclusions may not one day be compromised by new refuting evidence, or that we might discover faults in our reasoning and contrive better conceptualisations that overturn facts and theories we had held to be certain.

We tend to underestimate the extent to which modern science is controversial, uncertain, open-ended, capable of pluralistic accounts, and based on value-judgements—on this latter point soon more.

We tend to focus on the stable results of science, disregarding the huge volume of contested and unsettled science and the long trail of discarded chunks of once "certain knowledge."

So, is science "objective"? If by the term we mean "irrefutable" ("objective I"), then the answer is a resounding "no"!

Were we to think science a repository of irrefutable truths, strangely, we would find ourselves in the intellectual company of crocodiles, who probably think they know all there is to know. After all, their "omniscience" has worked well for their species.

Are we better off, feeling more uncertain about our knowledge than do crocodiles about theirs?

We surely are. Being curious, which implies uncertainty about our environment, is part of human nature just as predator teeth are part of  a crocodile's nature. We would probably be unhappy without the ability to indulge our curiosity and the sense of uncertainty that drive us, and it is a certainty that we would perish if we lost our human intelligence, for it has evolved to make us survive.

Continued here.

Quote of the Day — Hilary Putnam on the Genius of the Goofball

Image credit.

Suppose we have evolved with all the intelligence that we have [...] but with a firm prejudice against the unobservable.

Suppose we only believed in things we could see, hear, feel, touch, and so forth. [...]

We would not believe in gods, spirits in the trees and in the rivers, substance and accidents, forces and the "natural motions," and so on. 

We would never develop a religion or a metaphysics. 

But as far as observable things are concerned, we could be as "scientific" [believing that only science provides us with knowledge, all other thought being of lesser dignity] as you please. We might even be more "rational" than humans are, because we could not be led astray by "metaphysical prejudices."

Then we—or such a race of beings—could hunt deer, use stone axes and spears, make fires, and so forth, just as well as we actually can.

Such a race might even develop a civilization to the level of ancient Egypt. It would not develop geometry, beyond the Egyptian level of practical land measurement, because the notion of a straight line with no thickness at all, or the notion of a point with no dimensions at all, would make no sense to it.

It would never speculate about atoms swarming in the void, or about vis viva.

And, interestingly enough, it would never develop physics or mathematics!

Hilary Putnam in The Place of Facts in a World of Values, in Realism with a Human Face, p. 160

Incidentally, I take this quote to be a strong argument in favour of a democratic society of free and equal individuals.  Why?

In the first place, your silly neighbour may turn out the next Einstein. 

In the second place, a perfectly consistent rational system, authoritatively covering what there is to know and what ought to be known, is like the straight-jacket that elementary school teachers and tyrants like to impose on us. 

People are less controllable, less oppressed, and more open to desirable change when it is socially accepted or effectively tolerated that the decisive impetus for betterment will often come from outside the prevalent order; and that things are likely to turn for the worse when this kind of openness is missing. (See also Das Paradoxon der Freiheit and Theorie und Praxis)

Revolutionary improvements in the human condition inside and outside our brains depend on resources — intelligence, imagination, and ingenuity — whose distribution among all of us is rather even while the authorship of the highlight attainments of the human mind are impossible to predict and intricately enmeshed with countless lesser, yet indispensable contributions: Einstein depended on generations of previous thinkers, including the people who taught him elementary arithmetic and physics.

Organising the Chapter on Politics (7) — The Complete Gliederung

Image credit. A great artist, portraying a great city: Edinburgh, an important place for liberty, home to David Hume and Adam Smith (well, more or less), one of the hotbeds of the Scottish Enlightenment.

Continued from here.


This is how I propose to round off the Gliederung:

7.       Markets and Politics (also here)

8.       Privacy 

9.       Rights

10.     Between Faith and Scepticism

11.     Conclusion

★★★

The Full Gliederung:

1.       What Is Politics?

1.1     Politics — Wider Sense

1.2     Politics — Narrower Sense

1.3     Politics in General - Part of the Human Condition

2.       Politics under Conditions of Freedom

2.1     Freedom — Adapting to the Individualistic Age

2.2     Rise of Individualism

2.3     Politics and the State — Adaptations to the Individualistic Age

2.3.1  The New Social Persona - The Autonomous Individual as a State-provided Public Good

3.       The Politics of Public Goods

3.1     Political Participation - Organising the Permanent Redrafting of the Social Contract

3.2     Privatising Law and Life — The Individualistic State as Radical Privatiser

3.3     Disencumbering Justice by Auxilliary Forms of Legitimacy

4.       Political Culture in a Free Society

4.1     Epistemological Functions of Freedom and Politics - Politics as a Discovery Process

4.2     Science and Freedom — "Moral Images" à la Putnam - Open-ended, Incomplete and Changing

4.3     Culture-Questioning and Culture-Shaping in Civil Society

4.4     Politics as Part of the Division of Labour in a Free Society

4.5     Politics and Poppers World 3

4.6     The Long Road from Anthropocentric Freedom to Sociogenic Freedom

4.7     The System of Sociogenic Freedom — Politics - Improving State Technologies

 

5.        Dynamic Conditions of Politics in a Free Society

5.1      Myths Denigrating Politics

5.2      The SO of Rationally Adapting to SO - The Evolution of Skills of Interference

5.3      Politics a Means of Economising on Vice and Detriment (especially Predation)

5.4      Politics — Leveraging 'The Ultimate Resource'

5.5      'The Political Habitus' — It Is Natural for Modular Man to Act Politically

6.       Forms of Political Participation in a Free Society

6.1     The Presumption of Democratic Participation - the Taboo against Corruption

6.2     Participation within the Political Infrastructure

6.3     Subtler Forms of Participation within the Political Infrastructure

6.4     Participation outside the Political Infrastructure

7.       Markets and Politics (also here)

8.       Privacy 

9.       Rights

10.     Between Faith and Scepticism

11.     Conclusion

11.1   Results and Purpose of Freedom

11.2   Freedom as a Dynamic Equilibrating Order

11.3   Freedom and Democracy

11.4   Freedom as Choice, Empowerment, and Improved Adaptation 

11.5   Value-based Facts  — The Ubiquity of Values

11.6   The Wisdom of Freedom and Democracy