Politics is a modus operandi inextricably attached to human self-organisation—both in its personal and its collective forms—, an enterprise that human beings as social creatures are incessantly occupied with, irrespective of the specie's level of development. Politics is an anthropological constant. Under freedom, the anthropologically invariant elements are functionally rearranged and augmented so as to lend to politics a more symmetric and more pervasive character—that is to say, roughly speaking,
- the right to act politically—to shape what is socially valid— is democratised, and
- tradition is crowded out by discretion.
In at least two distinct ways, freedom enhances the significance of political conduct in society. For liberty creates two new types of political agents: the private person and the citizen.
Private Person
Counter-intuitive, paradoxical or downright erroneous as it may sound, (a) being an agent of protected public status, public consequence and public accountability, an individual qua private person is thoroughly enmeshed in politics.
In creating the private person, liberty has at the same time called into existence a new kind of public agent: the private person—with her own realm of competences and initiative—as legitimate claimant vis-à-vis society.
Citizen
Also, under freedom, (b) the private person qua citizen is entitled to participate in collective decision making as it concerns basic and vital questions of power and governance.
These—(a) and (b) above—are unique features of the individual in a free society. Notably, the individual is
The individual is invited and—in considerable measure—forced to take care of her own interests in ways that are blocked, unavailable or never imposed on her under conditions when freedom is deficient or absent.
The identity and private life of the individual, as well as her position and conduct in civil society—even outside of the machinery of politics and power—is characterised by what I like to call the "political habitus," i.e. a historically unique identity-shaping understanding that a human being as a person distinct from other persons is pragmatically required and morally and as of right entitled to develop own interests and seek to enforce these so as to assert herself as a claimant of individual demands on other humans and the community at large.
Private Person
Counter-intuitive, paradoxical or downright erroneous as it may sound, (a) being an agent of protected public status, public consequence and public accountability, an individual qua private person is thoroughly enmeshed in politics.
In creating the private person, liberty has at the same time called into existence a new kind of public agent: the private person—with her own realm of competences and initiative—as legitimate claimant vis-à-vis society.
Citizen
Also, under freedom, (b) the private person qua citizen is entitled to participate in collective decision making as it concerns basic and vital questions of power and governance.
These—(a) and (b) above—are unique features of the individual in a free society. Notably, the individual is
- granted the right to impose some of his private concerns on society,
- admitted to the process of determining the system of governance,
- integrated into the processes of policy making and control of power.
§ 14 - The Private Roots of Political Behaviour
The individual is invited and—in considerable measure—forced to take care of her own interests in ways that are blocked, unavailable or never imposed on her under conditions when freedom is deficient or absent.
The identity and private life of the individual, as well as her position and conduct in civil society—even outside of the machinery of politics and power—is characterised by what I like to call the "political habitus," i.e. a historically unique identity-shaping understanding that a human being as a person distinct from other persons is pragmatically required and morally and as of right entitled to develop own interests and seek to enforce these so as to assert herself as a claimant of individual demands on other humans and the community at large.
It is unprecedented in human history that the individual is not only
There is a subtle, yet momentous, link between the political habitus constantly adopted by the individual in spheres not normally thought of as political in character, on the one hand, and overt political activism in the sense of taking part in the processes explicitly designated as the channels and arenas of politics, on the other hand.
The Individual — Invited to Change Society
Modern man is free—in principle, and very largely in practice—to exert influence on all social environments of concern to him, many of which used to be closed off to him as an agent pursuing autonomous objectives (criticism, control and mandating of political executives), or did not exist in the absence of such an agent (organising life choices along personal lines). The modern individual's habit of acting politically—making personal demands on the canon of socially accepted practices—in the non-political realm carries over on a non-discreet continuum into action in the expressly political field.
The self-perception and cultural identity of the modern individual encourage him to perform as a political actor in his private life and on the public scene outside of politics. He sees himself as the bearer of fundamental entitlements that authorise him to bring his views and interests to the social bargaining table, on any social stage, whether represented by a personal relationship, family affairs, participation in smaller communities such as a circle of friends, the workplace, the parish etc or with respect to issues pertaining to larger social entities such as town, state, country or international communities.
To be free means to have a say in any issue a rational person may choose to take a stance on. Obviously, there are limits to the significance and legitimacy of any such personal involvement. However, what leaves the epochal imprint of the age of freedom it is the strong presumption of the individual's right to self-representation on virtually any subject that renders freedom thoroughly political.
In the first place, the political nature of freedom is anchored in the spheres of life closest and most natural to the average person. It is of the utmost importance to recognise that the high degree of autonomy granted to the individual under freedom does not involve a promise of relief from politics, but, to the contrary, produces a condition implicating the individual in a manner of life that exacts incessant political activity from her, that is: the assertion of personal demands—demands she has to answer for personally—vis-à-vis the endless flux of persons and events that animate the stage of social life.
- (a) accepted as a legitimate originator of personal demands on the social environment, but in modern society she is also
- (b) expected and needs to act as an agent of self-interest in order to organise her life and take care of her biographical prospects.
There is a subtle, yet momentous, link between the political habitus constantly adopted by the individual in spheres not normally thought of as political in character, on the one hand, and overt political activism in the sense of taking part in the processes explicitly designated as the channels and arenas of politics, on the other hand.
The Individual — Invited to Change Society
Modern man is free—in principle, and very largely in practice—to exert influence on all social environments of concern to him, many of which used to be closed off to him as an agent pursuing autonomous objectives (criticism, control and mandating of political executives), or did not exist in the absence of such an agent (organising life choices along personal lines). The modern individual's habit of acting politically—making personal demands on the canon of socially accepted practices—in the non-political realm carries over on a non-discreet continuum into action in the expressly political field.
The self-perception and cultural identity of the modern individual encourage him to perform as a political actor in his private life and on the public scene outside of politics. He sees himself as the bearer of fundamental entitlements that authorise him to bring his views and interests to the social bargaining table, on any social stage, whether represented by a personal relationship, family affairs, participation in smaller communities such as a circle of friends, the workplace, the parish etc or with respect to issues pertaining to larger social entities such as town, state, country or international communities.
To be free means to have a say in any issue a rational person may choose to take a stance on. Obviously, there are limits to the significance and legitimacy of any such personal involvement. However, what leaves the epochal imprint of the age of freedom it is the strong presumption of the individual's right to self-representation on virtually any subject that renders freedom thoroughly political.
In the first place, the political nature of freedom is anchored in the spheres of life closest and most natural to the average person. It is of the utmost importance to recognise that the high degree of autonomy granted to the individual under freedom does not involve a promise of relief from politics, but, to the contrary, produces a condition implicating the individual in a manner of life that exacts incessant political activity from her, that is: the assertion of personal demands—demands she has to answer for personally—vis-à-vis the endless flux of persons and events that animate the stage of social life.
In granting the individual a protected private domain, she is elevated to the rank of a political agent—a position denied to most human beings throughout most of human history. This may not be obvious, but the effect is irresistible: for any measure of socially tolerated private discretion implies self-representation, indeed an attribution of power, i.e. the right to present, assert, and defend (a) the integrity of that domain against external vitiation and (b) the proper fitting of the domain into the remainder of the social body.
By virtue of her being a holder of such rights to discretion she is enabled to commit acts of initiative until challenged. She may thereby create circumstances that affect the remainder of the social body and may be called upon to defend her interventions.
As an agent that is being granted a protected realm of private discretion, she thereby becomes a legitimate negotiating partner to the organs that represent the community.
She is allowed to make an impact on society from within her safe domain. This concession is subject to conditions the evaluation and negotiation of which she is allowed or required to take part in, as in a legal dispute or a petition for special licensing etc. In these instances, it is evident that her status as a private holder of rights involves considerable interlocking with concerns that are at least partially governed by competences outside of her own legitimate discretion.
We tend to think of the private sphere as something clearly distinct from the public realm. However, the insulation of personal activities from public interference which a protected private sphere makes possible is only a segment within the full picture of the relationship between the individual and society. To the extent that social insulation via privacy works well, it is due to success in connecting, coordinating and balancing private and public concerns sensibly.
The two fields are related to one another in countless ways, that is: one penetrates the other, making the private sphere a function of public requirements and tolerances, and vice versa. In other words: the private and the public form an interacting system, resembling two threads woven into a joint texture. Only a high regard for social concerns makes stable privacy viable, while indicators of high social performance (peace, productivity etc.) are strongly correlated with meaningful privacy.
The institute of being private is one of grave political moment. We shall see later on in the chapter that nothing could be more public than the opportunity offered in a free society of being private.
In short, there is a large class of private acts that have public implications, and in this sense, it is not possible for the individual to act autonomously without
- (a) enlisting political support for her individual freedom, to begin with, or
- (b) making a political impact on the world outside of her private realm—i.e. acting in the hope or conviction of conducting herself in a socially acceptable manner.
To sum up, the concession (to the individual) and the demand (on the individual) of greater personal autonomy, which is quintessential to liberty, has the effect of turning her into a political agent on behalf of herself, both in her personal life and as a member of her community. To which latter capacity, I now turn:
Continued here.
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