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I am
interested in Rousseau’s fundamental question: how is it possible to be free
and yet obedient to social constraints (principles, rules)? How do democratic
regimes actually work in free societies?
My research into theories of freedom has made
me aware that a free society cannot be fully accounted for by reference to rational
insight into the workings and justification of the overall order. There are
lacunae in public reasoning that are bridged by forms of interaction
whose effects in terms of fostering workable social cohesion and peaceable
coexistence are not consciously sought for. Thus democracies cannot be
sufficiently explained in terms of commonly held or complex philosophical justifications; fragmentary justifications plays a role, but their coherence also depends on transrational structures, as I surmise in my paper X.
How and why do democracies function, work
satisfactorily? And how does the inter-meshing of conscious strategies and
transrational outcomes contribute to viable democratic practices? Such
questions may yield significant implications for the ethical evaluation of
types of social order based on political freedom.
Widespread commitment to a political order, whether expressed by articulated reasoning or by revealed preference, may be important to that order, while not meriting the status of cause, being instead the reflection of numerous factors such as habits, traditions, inertia, opportunism, self-interest, etc. Is it possible to explain the functioning of a reasonably successful constitutional democracy in terms of a contiguous network of mutually compatible justificatory arguments? Why and how do we coordinate and collaborate in the absence of an ultimately consensual political morality?
Widespread commitment to a political order, whether expressed by articulated reasoning or by revealed preference, may be important to that order, while not meriting the status of cause, being instead the reflection of numerous factors such as habits, traditions, inertia, opportunism, self-interest, etc. Is it possible to explain the functioning of a reasonably successful constitutional democracy in terms of a contiguous network of mutually compatible justificatory arguments? Why and how do we coordinate and collaborate in the absence of an ultimately consensual political morality?
Are the emergence, the presence and depth
structure of a society’s common moral and political values adequately captured
by the analogy of a deliberated consent? Is ignorance, rational and substantive,
underestimated? And what forces are at play to keep the negative consequences
of ignorance at bay?
Cohesion may be in large part due to emergent
properties of dynamic disequilibrium interactions. Contributors to cohesion
will not necessarily be predictable from the behaviour of individual persons
/arguments.
There may actually be a tacit parallel between
rationalistic justificatory accounts of democracy and neoclassical economics on
one hand, and the intuitions of transrationality and heterodox economics, on
the other.
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