Gray's Liberalism (1) - A Review - Preface

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I. Over-rationalising Freedom

In his preface to the second edition of "Liberalism," John Gray sketches some of the striking revisionary claims that he has come to believe in since the first edition was published.

I contend that Gray is overstating his case, much of which, nota bene, I am sympathetic to -- namely that liberalism as an ideology is a failure. 

The closer rationalisations of the conditions and purposes of freedom come to exhibiting the hallmarks of an ideology, the more they get into conflict with evolved freedom, and, indeed, vital postulations and/or implications of the conceptions of freedom inherent in them. 

The boundaries of freedom are elastic and provide wide leeway for considerably divergent accounts of the good society. Denial of freedom's elasticity is a sure sign of an ideological bend in a liberal doctrine.

However, only in theory does liberalism manage to become paternalistic, telling people what conclusions they need to draw from the idea, (the intimations and the latitude) of freedom. In reality, outside the realm of chatter, freedom refutes paternalistic liberalism. By acting in considerable freedom people inevitably depart from wonkish ideas where they should be going.

This, however, is a far from trivial state of affairs. Freedom is highly relevant, her absence a catastrophe, a disfigurement of the world we wish to live in that shocks us all.

II. Over-Relativising Freedom

It appears to me that John Gray is going wrong in that he fails to distinguish between the feasibility of a unified theory of freedom, which indeed is doubtful, and the feasibility of freedom as an empirical reality, which is undeniable given the nature of some of contemporary societies. Also what I am missing in Gray`s below pronouncement, are examples and evidence of "postmodern" oder "postliberal alternatives." Where are they to be found, what are they like, which of their features make them "better" or "as good as," or "as admissible as" liberal societies?

I doubt, subsequent chapters will provide the answers I am demanding.

Writes John Gray,

I think now that the search for foundations for liberal practice is both futile and unnecessary, in that liberal regimes are far from universally mandatory or desirable, and are merely one segment of a range of institutions that may be legitimate in the late modern, or early post-modern world.

Gray, J. (1995), Liberalism. Second Edition, University of Minesota Press, MN, Mineapolis, p. ix

In the subsequent sentence below, Gray`s position meanders closer to mine:

Like other variations on the Enlightenment project, liberal theory runs aground on the impossibility of formulating a rational morality.

Ibid.

I agree wholeheartedly, if by "rational morality" he means a game (of correct behaviour and institutional logic, i.e. rules and other constraints on human interaction) that can be completely described without yielding contradictions and indeterminacies that make it impossible to play the game. 

Freedom is no such game. 

Attempts at a unified theory of liberalism are at best descriptions of games that do not correspond with real freedom. In fact, their subject are games that cannot be played, or they games that some people think can be played, but are not being played because a greater number of people then them think they cannot be played.  

Ideological accounts of freedom are descriptions of games that are unplayable, they are about games that are not elected for play because in the real world of feasible freedom people are seriously dedicated to playing playable plays.

However, the following statement is a non sequitur. From the fact that we cannot have a consistent general theory of freedom, it does not follow at all that there cannot be freedom, nor that the freedom that we are able to accomplish is for that reason less attractive than alternatives.

If the foundational pretensions of liberalism are hollow, so too is the claim that in our historical context there are no viable alternatives to liberal institutions.

Ibid.

In the postliberal and pluralist view I now hold, liberal regimes are only one type of legitimate polity, and liberal practice has no special or universal authority.

Whether a regime is legitimate depends on its relations with the cultural traditions of its subjects and its contribution to the satisfaction of their needs. It is far from being the case thaT liberal regimes always come out top when judged by these measures.

p. x

I believe there are grounds to make a normative case for liberal society, and they can be relied on to establish inter-systemic superiority.

To be continued in John Gray's Liberalism (2).