Justificatory Liberalism (2) - The Theory - A Second Attempt

 

Image credit. Continued from Justificatory Liberalism - The Theory - A First Attempt

With a view to bringing productive order to "the confused jumble of opposing factions" in philosophy and politics, can it be argued (as Gaus does) that just as liberalism is a response to religious sectarianism, it can also be a response to philosophical sectarians? 

For the wider background of Gaus's philosophy, let me have a second go at presenting his theory of justificatory liberalism. 

Justificatory Liberalism

The central concern of justificatory liberalism is the need to engage in public reasoning, a type of reasoning that is distinct from personal reasoning, as it is constrained by parameters that do not necessarily affect personal reasoning. The exercise of public reasoning is the quintessential sine qua non of liberalism and thus freedom as conceived of by liberalism.

The Propensity to Reason Publicly

At least four motives drive us to reason publicly: 

(1) the wish to avoid conflict, requires us to coordinate our reasoning, so as to come up with a common set of mutually justified rules. 

(2) The need to cooperate, which like (1) requires that we have jointly approved ways of acting / regulating our actions, which spheres of agreement, however, do not have to be based on the same reasons, nor do the relevant reasons have to be situated at the top of our preferences - they simply have to be good enough for the purpose of coordinating our moral frameworks.

(3) The search for public reasons may yield intellectual advances. Open discourse is an effective means of testing the veracity, coherence etc. of the propositions of individual reasoning.

These first three motives are general sociological findings, and do not by themselves already point to a specifically liberal order or a framework for freedom, but will be comprised by a such order or framework.

Free and equal - Towards Sociogenic Freedom

The aspect that gives public reasoning its specifically justificatory-liberal character introduces a  certain presumption concerning the way human beings are to relate to one another, namely as free and equal persons. 

Free is simply the converse of unfree, and equal the converse of unequal. Unfreedom entails that the station and actions of a person subjected to it may be interfered with at will, and without consideration of that person's demands or expectations. Inequality is implied by unfreedom in that he who is subjected to unfreedom is in precisely that respect unequal to any one subjecting him to unfreedom.

(4)

Hence,

if we are to treat others as free and equal persons, we must respect the principle of liberal legitimacy: 'our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.' Only if our claims on others can be justified to them, do we respect them [ - i.e. do we treat them as free and equal.] 

Gaus, G. (2003), Contemporary Theories of Liberalism, Sage Publications,  p. 206

There is a fundamental asymmetry between a person's action and another person's interference with this action. 

The Liberal Principle

The liberal tradition in political philosophy maintains that each person is free to do as he wishes until some justification is offered for limiting his liberty.  

Ibid.

That is the Liberal Principle on which Gaus builds his theory of justificatory liberalism.

Since it is a concern of all human beings to protect their scope of agency, i.e. their ability to act on their own volition, people have a strong incentive to work out a mutual accommodation based on transparent public reasoning that enjoins on the proponent of interference the obligation to justify his obstruction.

Distinction between Personal and Public Reasons

Personal reasons are relative to the autonomous individual and the fact and the right of having, acting on and basing inferences on idiosyncratic preferences, thoughts, values. They represent grounds that are sufficient for the individual to act on, but not necessarily for others as well.

Public reasons, by contrast, are considerations that are not only verified from [one person's] perspective, but from [other persons'] as well.

Ibid. p. 209

More specifically, a proposition (P) subjected to public reasoning 

... is publicly justified if an only if everyone has reasonable grounds for accepting it (or no one has reasonable grounds  for rejecting it) ... 

p. 211

If there is further resistance against claims of argumentative prevalence,

we must be able to show that the principle invoked is somehow valid beyond reasonable doubt.

p. 212

Ideally, we seek to invoke justifications that are victorious over all challenges:

Let us call a justification victorious if it has been open to public challenges for a considerable period and has been defeated all of them.

p. 212

Epistemological Stand-offs

But what about epistemological stand-offs, when either neither defeat nor victory has been established or arguments may be classified as undefeated but not victorious? Gaus recognises that epistemological stand-offs are widespread, but insists:

Moral debate among liberal citizens makes sense because we can and do form opinions on the basis of public reasons.

p. 215

But, then, how do we arrive at new public reasons when stand-off conditions prevail, barring convergence on a victorious proposition? Gaus makes it clear that

to impose an undefeated but unvictorious public justification on anther fails to meet the demands of public justification.

p. 218

So what now?

Umpiring

Gaus' solution comes in the form of a Lockean umpire who is required to be impartial and sensitive to the best efforts at not fully consummated public justification. He is a concession to the need to get on with life in the face of inconclusive deliberative outcomes. He is empowered to act on merely reasonable judgement rather than conclusively justified reasons.

Because (1) we require a common answer on questions of justice, (2) we have conclusive reason to embrace an umpire, (3) we thus have a good reason to follow the directives of the umpire even though they are only reasonable. In short, there is a conclusive justification to follow the reasonable but not conclusive decisions of the umpire.

p. 221

Gauss appears to suggest that being committed to the Liberal Principle, the umpire will tend to act as a break to illegitimate impositions.

Also, he will be aided in his task by widespread deliberation and discussion.

Apparently, Gaus has multiple institutions in mind when he refers to umpiring - the Supreme Court for instance - but he does regard the whole system of democracy as an agency of umpiring:

Thus, the everyday institutions of democratic rule such as voting are ... the heart of democracy, for they define how the umpire operates.

p. 225

And finally,

...political life is possible even in the face of mutual conviction of the unreasonability of others if each party has grounds for accepting the reasonability of the umpiring mechanism.

p.226